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A Framework for Bailout Regulation
Anthony J. Casey & Eric A. Posner1
University of Chicago Law School
February 11, 2015
Abstract. During the height of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009,
the government bailed out numerous corporations, including banks,
investment banks, and automobile manufacturers. While the bailouts
helped end the financial crisis, they were intensely controversial at the
time, and were marred by the ad hoc, politicized quality of the
government intervention. We examine the bailouts from the financial
crisis as well as earlier bailouts to determine what policy
considerations best justify them, and how they are best designed. The
major considerations in bailing out and structuring the bailout of a
firm are the macroeconomic impact of failure; the moral hazard effect
of the bailout; the discriminatory effect of the bailout; and procedural
fairness. Future bailouts should be guided by principles that ensure
that the decisionmaker properly takes into account these factors.

University of Chicago Law School. We thank Stephen Choi, William Hubbard, Richard McAdams,
David Yermack, and participants in workshops at NYU Stern School of Business and the University
of Chicago Law School for comments, and Paul Rogerson and Paulina Wu for research assistance.
Although we do not take a position on AIG’s claims in its bailout-related litigation, we should
disclose that one of us (Posner) has done work in that litigation for the plaintiff. He is grateful to the
late Robert Silver for illuminating discussions about bailout law and policy in the context of that
litigation.
1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2564259

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 3	
  
I.	
   BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................. 7	
  
II.	
   WHAT IS A BAILOUT? ............................................................................................... 11	
  
A.	
   Definition ............................................................................................................ 11	
  
1.	
   Liquidity Constraints ...................................................................................... 11	
  
2.	
   Ex Post ............................................................................................................. 12	
  
3.	
   Targeted ........................................................................................................... 14	
  
B.	
   Disguised Bailouts ............................................................................................. 14	
  
C.	
   Direct and Indirect Beneficiaries of Bailouts ................................................... 15	
  
D.	
   The Structure of a Bailout ................................................................................. 16	
  
E.	
   Who Makes the Bailout? .................................................................................... 18	
  
F.	
   Some Recent Bailouts ........................................................................................ 19	
  
III.	
   CASE STUDIES ....................................................................................................... 21	
  
A.	
   The Lockheed Bailout ........................................................................................ 21	
  
B.	
   1979 Chrysler Bailout ........................................................................................ 23	
  
C.	
   S&L Bailouts ...................................................................................................... 26	
  
D.	
   9/11 Airline Bailout............................................................................................ 29	
  
E.	
   2008-2009 Financial Crisis Bailouts ................................................................. 30	
  
1.	
   Fannie/Freddie ................................................................................................ 31	
  
2.	
   Banks, Investment Banks, and Related Institutions .................................... 37	
  
3.	
   Automobile Companies ................................................................................... 41	
  
F.	
   Lessons ................................................................................................................ 48	
  
1.	
   Ex Post Efficient .............................................................................................. 48	
  
2.	
   Fairness/Discrimination ................................................................................. 50	
  
3.	
   Moral Hazard .................................................................................................. 50	
  
4.	
   Process ............................................................................................................. 52	
  
IV.	
   PRINCIPLES FOR GOVERNING BAILOUTS ................................................................ 54	
  
A.	
   Substantive Principles ....................................................................................... 54	
  
1.	
   Ex Post Efficiency............................................................................................ 54	
  
2.	
   Moral Hazard .................................................................................................. 55	
  
3.	
   Fairness ........................................................................................................... 57	
  
4.	
   Administrative Costs ...................................................................................... 59	
  
B.	
   Procedural Principles ......................................................................................... 60	
  
CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX OF BAILOUT REGULATION ................................................. 62	
  

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2564259

INTRODUCTION
Since the financial crisis of 2008, the word “bailout” has become a term of abuse
in our political lexicon. The bailouts of numerous financial institutions and two
automobile manufacturers were extremely controversial.2 Congress sought in the
Dodd-Frank Act to ensure that bailouts would never take place again, going so far
as to write into the preamble that one purpose of the Act was to “to protect the
American taxpayer by ending bailouts.”3 President Barack Obama agreed that
“because of this law, the American people will never again be asked to foot the bill
for Wall Street’s mistakes.”4 But after his former Treasury secretary admitted that
Dodd-Frank would not end bailouts, Republicans in the House of Representatives
issued a scathing report entitled “Failing to End ‘Too Big to Fail’: An Assessment of
the Dodd-Frank Act Four Years Later.”5 The political unpopularity of bailouts is
matched in the academic literature, where the traditional view is that bailouts are
almost always unwise, and usually result from political failure.6
But the word “bailout” is used in different ways, and it is sometimes hard to get
clear what people are complaining about. A bailout is, essentially, a transfer of
money or other resources from the government to a private agent (or sometimes to
another government). Such transfers occur every day and hardly ever cause anyone
to lift an eyebrow. The government transfers money or other valuable consideration
to solar panel manufacturers, dairy farmers, poor people, and research universities.
While many people disagree about the wisdom of these transfers, they do not regard
them as illegitimate in the same way that they often regard bailouts.
We can make some progress by observing that in common parlance the word
bailout refers to a subset of transfers where the transfer is intended to rescue an
agent who cannot meet its financial obligations. Even here, however, the source of
complaint is obscure. If the government is willing to subsidize a manufacturer of
solar power panels by giving it money, making loans to it, or guaranteeing its debt
(as it often is), then what’s wrong with a policy of paying off an unpaid debt if
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Constituents Make Their Bailout Views Known, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2008, at
A27 (“Senator Barbara Boxer, Democrat of California, has received nearly 17,000 e-mail messages,
nearly all opposed to the bailout, her office said.”).
2

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
3

President Barack H. Obama, Remarks on Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1087, 1089 (July 21, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-streetreform-and-consumer-protection-act.
4

REP. STAFF OF COMM. ON FIN. SERV., U.S. HOUSE OF REP., 113TH CONG., FAILING TO END ‘TOO BIG TO
FAIL’: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT FOUR YEARS LATER, (July 2014),
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/071814_tbtf_report_final.pdf.
5

6

See infra Part I.
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otherwise it would default? The effect of all these policies is the same: to lower the
cost of capital for the beneficiary. The policy justification is also the same: to
encourage people to invest in solar power.
Indeed, the government routinely helps agents who are about to default on
debts. The FDIC, for example, insures people against loss of their deposits up to
$250,000.7 If a bank fails, the FDIC transfers money to depositors, in this way
paying the bank’s debts (or some of them) for it. Similarly, if a natural disaster
strikes, the government frequently assists victims by supplying them with loan
guarantees and other benefits that make it easier for them to pay off their debts
while they are rebuilding their lives.8
FDIC payments are not called “bailouts”; why not? One reason is that the
payouts are part of a regulatory program that puts burdens on banks and
depositors. Banks must pay for FDIC insurance, and they must submit to
regulations that are designed to prevent them from taking excessive risks. These
costs are passed on to depositors in the form of interest rates on checking accounts
that are lower than they would otherwise be. Thus, the FDIC payouts seem no more
objectionable than payouts made by a private insurance company. In both cases, the
insured party pays for the insurance, so when insurance payouts are made, they do
not seem undeserved.
Similarly, banks often receive cheap loans from the Fed that help them through
spells of illiquidity. These discount window loans, as they are called, do not offend
public values because the banks can receive them only if they are members of the
Federal Reserve System, which requires them to purchase capital in federal reserve
banks and submit to regulations. Banks must also pay for the loans in the form of
interest.
Any reasonable definition of bailouts will need to encompass “good” (or at least,
uncontroversial) bailouts as well as “bad” bailouts. We are comfortable with the
following definition. A bailout occurs when the government makes payments
(including loans, loan guarantees, cash, and other types of consideration) to a
liquidity-constrained private agent in order to enable that agent to pay its creditors
and counterparties, when the agent is not entitled to those payments under a
statutory scheme. As we will see, this definition of bailout admits for some fuzzy
cases, but it will serve.

7

12 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (2012).

See, e.g.,15 U.S.C. § 636(b) (2012) (authorizing the Small Business Administration to offer loans
and other financial assistance to businesses and private citizens after a disaster). There are many
such programs. See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-195 ENR, A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF
FEDERAL RELIEF, INSURANCE, AND LOSS REDUCTION PROGRAMS FOR NATURAL HAZARDS (1992); Barry
J. Barnett, US Government Natural Disaster Assistance: Historical Analysis and a Proposal for the
Future, 23 DISASTERS 139 (1999).
8
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The key feature of the bailout—and the feature that makes people so
uncomfortable—is that it is ex post. People who operate in the private market are
expected to be responsible for their debts when they have not paid for guarantees or
insurance. Everyone expects them to take precautions to ensure that they can pay
their debt, or not to take on the debt in the first place.
It is for this reason that many people believe that bailouts violate the rule of law
or offend other norms of our constitutional system.9 Bailout recipients have no
entitlement to a bailout yet they receive one anyway. Moreover, the prospect of a
bailout may encourage firms to engage in risky behavior. Often bailouts occur
during emergencies, and it is thought that the beneficiary takes advantage of the
press of time to push through the bailout plan. That is why Congress sought to end
bailouts once and for all in Dodd-Frank.
Yet, as we will argue, governments should not try to legislate away bailouts.
Bailouts are socially desirable because Congress cannot anticipate the contingencies
that would make possible an ex ante insurance system that regulates behavior and
charges firms in advance for liquidity support or other transfers. The question then
arises whether bailouts can nonetheless be regulated in advance so that the worst
types of bailouts are avoided and only good bailouts are implemented. In short, can
we develop some rules or principles that govern how the government uses bailouts
when, by hypothesis, we cannot legislate the specific conditions under which they
must or must not be used?
The answer is—yes. Congress frequently regulates the way that the government
(including itself, but mainly the president and regulatory agencies) addresses some
problem while nonetheless allowing it the discretion to determine whether to
address the problem in the first place. A humdrum example comes from law
enforcement. Law enforcement officials enjoy enormous discretion whether to
respond to a call for help, investigate a crime, file charges, and prosecute. But they
face numerous constraints on how they pursue actions once they decide to take
them. A police officer can refrain from helping someone pursue a bike thief, but if
the officer chooses to help, he cannot make searches without a warrant. A

See, e.g., John B. Taylor, The Role of Policy in the Great Recession and the Weak Recovery, 104
AMER. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC., 61, 62-63 (2014) (noting that “ad hoc bailout policy” trampled
existing law); Gary Lawson, Burying the Constitution Under a TARP, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55,
58 (2009) (describing TARP as “a constitutional monstrosity”); Lawrence H. White, The Rule of Law
or the Rule of Central Bankers?, 30 CATO J. 451 (2010) (arguing that government officials in the crisis
“consider[ed] every possible remedy but applying the rule of law”); Todd J. Zywicki, Chrysler and The
Rule of Law, WALL ST. J., (May 13, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB124217356836613091
(arguing that the 2009 Chrysler bailout violates the rule of law principle); Timothy A. Canova,
Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: From Market Fundamentalism to a New
Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 369, 392 (2009) (describing the Federal
Reserves’ actions during the crisis as extreme violations of the rule of law and “flagrant”
constitutional violations).
9
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prosecutor can decline to prosecute, but if she prosecutes, she cannot do so in a way
that violates the code of ethics.
Moreover, the law already provides a basis for challenging bailouts, albeit a
weak and confusing one. Bailouts are “givings” rather than “takings,” and thus not
directly addressed by the Takings Clause of the Constitution.10 There is no law that
permits people to compel the government to bail them out. Yet both statutory and
constitutional law provides some constraints on bailouts. The Fed—the major
bailout agency—is governed by a statute that limits who it can bail out, and the
terms of bailouts. The Bankruptcy Code puts constraints on bailouts when they
take place in bankruptcy. And both the Takings Clause and the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine may come into play if the government conditions a bailout on
waiver of constitutional rights.11
These bodies of law have played a role in significant litigation that has emerged
from the financial crisis. In 2013, shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
sued the government on the ground that the federal rescue expropriated their
property by eliminating their right to the firms’ profits. In 2011, automobile dealers
brought a lawsuit against the government that argued that during the bailout the
government compelled the auto makers to terminate contracts with them. Also in
2011, shareholders of the vast insurance company AIG sued the government for
diluting their equity when it made emergency loans to AIG. All of the lawsuits
argued that the government violated the Takings clause, and in each case a court
was willing to entertain the argument if the plaintiffs could prove the factual
predicates of their claims.12
Thus, one cannot avoid thinking about the optimal regulation of bailouts—if only
to understand and criticize existing law. At the same time, the regulation of
bailouts poses some special problems. The source of a bailout is often Congress
itself, and so Congress may choose to disregard earlier legislation that seeks to
constrain it. Even when a bailout comes from the Fed or another agency, Congress
might be reluctant to impose constraints on it just because bailouts are by definition
pursued in extraordinary, hard-to-anticipate situations, unlike regular law
enforcement. For this reason, we will propose bailout “principles” without taking a
position on whether they can be embodied in a statute. Perhaps they can; but if they
can’t, we will argue that stated principles, even if not legally enforceable, may be a
useful way to structure the political response to bailouts.

Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L. J. 547 (2011) (observing that
givings pose the same constitutional problems that takings do).
10

The question of whether the government exceeded these constraints during the financial crisis
bailouts is the subject of various ongoing lawsuits. See David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis,
100 VA. L. REV. 1405 (2014).
11

12

See discussion infra Part III.E.
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In Part I, we provide a brief review of the legal literature on bailouts. In Part II,
we discuss the idea of a bailout, and explain why it is useful to identify it as a
residual category of transfers that the government makes when existing law “runs
out.” In Part III, we draw some lessons from notable bailouts—from the financial
crisis, and before. Criticism of them can be divided into four categories: they were
not socially desirable from an ex post perspective; they were unfair (they treated
like people or firms unalike); they produced moral hazard and other bad incentives
for people who expect more bailouts in the future; and they did not obey principles
of procedural due process. These lessons motivate our proposed Bailout Principles,
which we discuss in Part IV. The Bailout Principles describe rules that maximize
the likelihood that bailouts will serve the public interest.
I.

BACKGROUND

Before the financial crisis, the legal literature on bailouts was sparse. A single
article, written by Professor Cheryl Block, offered a framework for thinking about
certain bailouts.13 Block points out that bailouts are ex post government
interventions that may produce perverse incentives, but she defines bailouts more
broadly than we do to encompass insurance payouts made pursuant to ex ante
insurance schemes.14 So while Block ends up discussing how such insurance
schemes should be designed,15 we focus on payouts that are made in the absence of
such schemes.
The post-financial crisis literature on bailouts is vast. Most of the scholarship
describes and evaluates specific bailouts,16 and does not attempt to provide
principles of bailout regulation, as we do. Many scholars have also written about the
implications of the financial crisis for financial regulation, bankruptcy law and
other insolvency regimes.17

Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L. J. 951,
956-58 (1992).
13

14

Id. at 972-976 (discussing “prospective bailout” regimes).

15

Id. at 1033-34.

See generally Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel Jr., Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 727 (2010); Steven Davidoff Solomon & David Zaring, After the Deal: Fannie, Freddie, and the
Financial Crisis Aftermath, B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Adam B. Badawi & Anthony J. Casey,
The Fannie and Freddie Bailouts Through the Corporate Lens, 1 N.Y.U. J. BUS. L. 443 (2014); see
also Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the
Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN L. REV. 463 (2009) (providing a descriptive examination of some of the
government reactions to the financial crisis).
16

See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469 (2010);
Edward R. Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mechanism for Resolving the Distress of
Systemically Important Institutions?, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 449 (2009); Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis
Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051 (2009); Steven L. Schwarz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193
(2009); see also Richard W. Painter, Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics When
17
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A few scholars have begun exploring how bailouts should be regulated.18
Professor Adam Levitin argues that a bailout system should have “political
accountability as the paramount institutional design goal”—by which he means that
a bailout should please the median voter—and offers some design principles for
ensuring that bailouts will be politically legitimate.19 By contrast, we argue that
bailouts should serve public policy (should be “efficient,” in a broad sense); we
assume that they will be politically legitimate if they are consistent with principles
that tend to ensure efficiency or good public policy. Indeed, when the government
enacts bad policy in response to short-term public demand, its legitimacy can be
hurt in the long run. This is especially true where, as in the case of bailouts,
popular preferences tend to exhibit significant temporal inconsistency.20
Professor Jeffrey Manns proposes to subject bailouts to a set of limitations.21 He
identifies three principles behind these limitations: (1) deterring moral hazard; (2)
recouping the government’s investment; and (3) linking bailouts to governance
reform.22 These principles lead him to propose an investment fund – the Federal
Government Investment Corporation (FGIC) – with the limited power to make

Government Pays the Tab, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 131 (2009) (discussing the implication of the crisis
and bailouts on theories of political corruption). An enormous amount has been written on the
regulation and resolution of financial institutions specifically. Much of this literature is focused more
on assessing the Dodd-Frank Act and ex ante regulations to prevent the systemic spread of the
failure of financial institution. It is difficult, however, to separate this literature from bailout
literature more broadly as the two issues are so deeply intertwined after the financial crisis. See, e.g.,
Thomas H. Jackon & David A. Skeel Jr., Dynamic Resolution of Large Financial Institutions, 2 Harv.
BUS. L. REV. 435 (2012); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate
Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011); John Armour & Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. L. ANALYSIS 35 (2014); Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and the Case for a
Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. REG. 151 (2011); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher
Muller, Avoiding Eight-Alarm Fires in the Political Economy of Systemic Risk Management
(Columbia
Law
and
Economics
Research
Paper
No.
369,
2010),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553880; Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L.
REV. 293 (2012).
See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L. J. 435 (2011); Jeffrey Manns, Building
Better Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term Investment Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349 (2011); Iman
Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of
Financial Failure, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 75 (2013); see also Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder
Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409 (2012) (proposing an elective shareholder liability mechanism to
reduce moral hazard and windfall problems inherent in the operation bailouts of financial
institutions).
18

19

Levitin, supra note 18, at 506.

20

See infra II.E.4.

21

Manns, supra note 18, at 1383-84.

22

Id. at 1388.
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bailout funds available under certain conditions.23 The FGIC would have authority
to invest in systemically significant firms where it could certify that default raises
systemic risk.24 Even with those thresholds met, the FGIC would be limited in
implementing the bailout. The fund would be permitted to invest no more than 50%
of the equity value of any bailout recipient for a limited period of time.25 Creditors
would be required to take a haircut, and the bailout recipient would be required to
undergo corporate governance reforms.26
But the second and third principles are not proper goals of a bailout system.27
While the performance of a government investment is one relevant measure of ex
post efficiency, it is not an end in itself. A bailout that prevents social losses of $100
billion at a cost of $5 billion for the government is a socially beneficial bailout. And
while corporate governance reform is a valid goal, a bailout is not a good time to
implement it. The government’s role as a bailout monopolist gives it leverage over
recipients, which lends itself to abuse. Moreover, because bailout decisions must
typically be made with great rapidity, officials do not have the time to evaluate a
firm’s governance structure and propose reforms.
Professors Iman Anabtawi and Steven Schwarz argue that bailouts are part of a
necessary ex post system of financial regulation.28 In an analysis of the broader
question of financial regulation, they suggest that financial risk must be regulated
both through ex ante and ex post measures.29 Among the necessary ex post
measures, they include bailouts or “safety nets.” They suggest that the power to
provide safety nets should be institutionalized in a standing government agency
with the power to invest in firms that are too big to fail.30 They identify some costs

23

Id. at 1383-84.

24

Id. at 1396.

Under this rule, the government has to take a share of convertible equity in the firm that is
proportional to the amount it invests. And that share is limited to 50% of the firm’s equity value. Id.
at 1386-87.
25

26

Id. at 1388-89, 1391-92.

Manns’s first principle – deterring moral hazard – is one on which we agree. But Manns
overweights this principle’s importance. He identifies moral hazard concerns as the “key” to
designing bailouts. Id. at 1388. We suggest below that moral hazard can be a concern in some but
not all cases. A narrow focus on moral hazard can obscure the other principles of fairness, efficiency,
and process that we identify. Similarly we agree with Manns that there are risks to ex post
discretion, see id. at 1404, but his attempts to prevent this through strict ex ante formulas for
investment removes the value of bailouts and relegates government power to those cases where
bailouts are by definition unnecessary.
27

28

Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 102–12.

29

Id. at 130.

30

Id. at 106. They argue that an existing authority, rather than an ad hoc response to crisis, will
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inherent in these safety nets – namely moral hazard and false positives. Beyond
noting some of the ways that moral hazard can be reduced,31 they do not, however,
provide guidelines for the exercise of the bailout power.32
There is also a large economic literature on bailouts of financial firms during
liquidity crises.33 Most economists believe that the central bank should make
secured loans to illiquid but solvent financial institutions during a liquidity crisis.34
When a bailout produces positive externalities (typically in the form of restoring
liquidity to the market) that exceed moral hazard costs, it is socially beneficial.35
Many economists and central bankers believe that relatively clear rules are needed
to govern bailouts in order to constrain central banks and ensure that they
maintain legitimacy in a democratic system.36
Our article builds on this literature, but we try to derive a more detailed set of
principles for regulating bailouts, based on our interpretation of the successes and
problems with numerous bailouts that have taken place since 1970. We draw on
some of the insights in the economic literature, but our approach is both more
general—we look at all bailouts, not just financial bailouts—and more specific—we
propose rules for governing bailouts that are attentive to legal norms and
institutional structure.

“permit [safety net] design to be developed with the benefit of careful analysis” and “provide a source
of preexisting authority, as well as political legitimacy, to market liquidity providers.” Id. at 112.
They identify haircuts and “a credible policy of constructive ambiguity” as measures to reduce
moral hazard. Id. at 124.
31

Their primary focus is on showing the tradeoff between ex ante and ex post regulation rather than
providing a prescriptive guide for implementing the various forms of ex post regulation. Id. at 11011.
32

See, e.g., THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT (Forrest H. Capie & Geoffrey E. Wood, eds. 2007);
FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT: A READER (Charles Goodhart &
Gerhard Illing, eds. 2002); FINANCIAL CRISES: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY RESPONSES (Stijn
Claessens et al., eds. 2013); Stanley Fischer, On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort,
13 J. ECON. PERSP. 85 (1999).
33

J. Bradford DeLong, This Time, It is Not Different: The Persistent Concerns of Financial
Macroeconomics, (Apr. 2012), http://delong.typepad.com/20120411-russell-sage-delong-paper.pdf.
34

Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric Talley, & Ivo Welch, A Model of Optimal Government Bailouts, (2011),
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8wv4p90c.
35

See Paul Tucker, Independent Agencies In Democracies: Legitimacy and Boundaries for the New
Central Banks (2014) (unpublished manuscript).
36
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II.

WHAT IS A BAILOUT?

A. Definition
We define a “bailout” as an ex post government transfer (a loan, cash, or other
consideration) to an agent or group of agents to provide capital that is otherwise
unavailable because of liquidity constraints. In most cases, this will take the form of
a transfer to prevent the agent from defaulting on debt, but that is not a technical
necessity.
1. Liquidity Constraints
We stipulate that the bailout recipient faces liquidity problems in order to
distinguish a bailout from a regular transfer. Consider a firm that makes widgets
and finances its operations with debt. A cyclical downturn has imposed a cash-flow
shock on the firm. Although the firm remains economically viable, it cannot pay its
debts. In a perfectly functioning capital market, the firm would refinance its debts
and continue operation without a bailout.37 Any government transfer under these
conditions would be a subsidy.
Now assume that there is a simultaneous liquidity shock to the financial
markets that makes it impossible for the firm to raise the funds necessary to
continue. This is the most straightforward case for a bailout. The government
provides the liquidity to prevent an economically viable firm from collapsing.
Still, a firm may in some cases be unable to raise capital even without defaulting
on prior debt. Our widget company may have had an all equity capital structure.
That does not change the fact that when the cyclical downturn hits, it needs to raise
funds for future operations. Again, where capital is unavailable, the government’s
role as liquidity provider is implicated and a transfer made in that role would be a
bailout.
In contrast, a firm may be failing economically regardless of capital markets.
People may simply not want to buy widgets anymore at a price that makes
production worthwhile. Any government transfer to the firm in that situation is a
mere subsidy.38

To the extent there is a debt overhang problem, bankruptcy without a government bailout could
still facilitate the refinancing. David A. Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 687
(2012).
37

We will see below that critics of the auto bailout claimed that they were, in fact, subsidies of this
kind. The government took the contrary position. Our view is that intent matters. A transfer to a
firm everyone knows is economically failed is not a bailout. A bailout to a firm that is thought by the
government to be viable but turns out to be failed, is a misguided or bad bailout. As the auto bailouts
highlight, actual intent can be difficult to discover. This argues in favor of some of the guiding
principles to minimize abuse of discretion that we advocate below.
38
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Complications pile up when we consider the possibility of indirect bailouts. A
financially troubled widget firm may have numerous stakeholders—employees,
creditors, and others—who will be badly hurt if the firm collapses. The failure of the
firm may cause a financial shock to the employees or counterparties. Again, the
problem exists only where an imperfection in capital markets prevents
counterparties from obtaining credit. A laid-off employee may not be able to finance
her retraining; a counterparty on a major contract or a creditor may not be able to
raise enough capital to survive the cash-flow shock from the widget firm’s failure. In
these cases, the government may want to bail out the employees or counterparties
but it may determine that the most cost-effective way to do this is to inject capital
into the widget firm. This is (or could be, depending on how the bailout is
structured) a wealth transfer or subsidy to the widget firm, but it is also an indirect
bailout to the employees or counterparties.39
This final example reveals two important points. First, all bailouts are
ultimately about liquidity. The government either bails out economically viable
liquidity-constrained firms or it indirectly bails out the liquidity-constrained
stakeholders in a firm (when the firm may be insolvent). Second, distinguishing
indirect bailouts from mere subsidies (especially for non-financial firms) can be
difficult as the distinction turns on whether the purpose of the transfer is to prevent
a liquidity crisis for the firm’s stakeholders. And the likelihood that such a liquidity
crisis would result from the firm’s collapse is difficult to measure. Thus, the
assertion that the government is making the transfer for that purpose can rarely be
proven or refuted with any certainty.
2. Ex Post
The second feature of the definition just laid out is that the bailout must come ex
post—as a transfer that was not paid for in advance, as in the case of insurance.40
Ex ante safety nets are insurance rather than bailouts. To be clear about this point,
imagine a timeline in which an agent makes an investment at time 1, and the
investment is realized as a success or failure at time 2. If the government believes
that the investment should be subsidized, it may offer a tax break, loan guarantee,
or other subsidy to the agent before time 1. Such a subsidy is not a bailout. By
contrast, if the investment fails at time 2, and then the government makes a
transfer to the agent to prevent it from defaulting on its obligations, a bailout has
occurred.

39

One could also have an indirect bailout of the counterparties of the counterparties (and so on).

On the difference between ex post and ex ante legal norms, see Louis Kaplow, Rules versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557, 571–77 (1992).
40
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The clearest example of government insurance is the FDIC program.41 Banks
pay premiums for this insurance, and in return depositors are entitled to
compensation from the FDIC of up to $250,000 if the bank is unable to pay them.
FDIC insurance, in principle, is not a subsidy because banks must pay premiums;
thus, the payment to the depositors is not a bailout. Moreover, even if FDIC
insurance is underpriced, as is sometimes argued,42 the payouts are not bailouts
because depositors have a legal right to the payouts. The underpricing of FDIC
insurance is just a typical ex ante subsidy.
By contrast, the Fed’s power under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act does
give the Fed the power to make bailouts.43 Under 13(3), the Fed can make belowmarket loans to illiquid non-bank institutions. These institutions do not make ex
ante payments to the Fed, and have no legal entitlement to the loans, so 13(3)
cannot be classified as an insurance program. The purpose of a 13(3) loan is to
enable the borrower to pay its debts; hence, a 13(3) loan is a bailout.44
An interesting middle case is the Fed’s power to make discount-window loans to
banks under section 10(b).45 The banks that receive these loans make mandatory
capital contributions to a Federal Reserve Bank, but these contributions are not
priced to reflect future need for loans. On the other hand, banks do pay interest on
the loans ex post, and must submit ex ante to regulation. Legally, the loans are
discretionary rather than as of right; yet banks expect them and the Fed has a legal
obligation to use the discount window to end banking panics. For this reason,
section 10(b) loans fall somewhere between a pure bailout and an insurance payout.
This two-part definition can be applied to distinguish close cases. Under our
definition, government loans to victims of natural disasters should be classified as
bailouts to the extent that those loans are designed to enable victims to avoid
defaulting on debts. People do not pay ex ante for the legal right to these payments,
so disaster programs are not insurance. At the same time, transfers to victims of
natural disasters are not always designed to address the financial shock created by
the disaster or enable the people to pay off their debts. Their general purpose is

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
https://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/.
41

WHO

IS

THE

FDIC?,

(Oct.

30.

2014),

George G. Pennacchi, A Reexamination of the Over- (or Under-) Pricing of Deposit Insurance, 19 J.
MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 340 (1987).
42

43

Federal Reserve Act, § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012).

Not everyone agrees that an emergency loan of this type should be called a “bailout.” For example,
the former central banker Paul Tucker uses “bailout” to refer only to loans to insolvent firms. See
Tucker, supra note 36, at 40. We use the term more broadly than he does, following popular usage.
44

45

Federal Reserve Act § 10B, 12 U.S.C. § 347(b) (2012).
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often humanitarian compensation rather than macroeconomic intervention. So
natural disaster relief lies close to the borderline of our definition.46
3. Targeted
In practice, people refer to bailouts as transfers that are made to specific firms or
an industry. This feature of our definition is not essential to it; in principle, the
government could bail out the entire economy. When the Fed reduces interest rates,
it provides just such a bailout—an ex post transfer in the form of liquidity, which
benefits banks and ideally encourages them to lend to businesses and consumers.47
Some economists support such open-market operations while opposing bailouts.48
They are bothered not so much by ex post government intervention but by targeted
intervention that may be influenced by political considerations.
Bailouts can take other forms as well. In 2008, the Fed purchased commercial
paper from eligible firms.49 In doing so, it provided low-cost liquidity to a class of
firms. The Fed’s actions kept them alive but did not fully bail them out. We refer to
this type of support as a “partial bailout.”
B. Disguised Bailouts
The definition can be difficult to apply where the transfer itself is disguised or
hidden. We call these transfers “disguised bailouts.” They take place without an
explicit transfer of consideration to a firm. In the S&L crisis, regulators initially
tried to rescue insolvent firms by encouraging solvent firms to buy them. Since the
insolvent firms had negative value, the regulators “paid” the solvent firms in the
form of regulatory forbearance—promising not to enforce certain regulations
against them. Since those regulations imposed costs on the firms in question,
regulatory forbearance amounted to a transfer of value. As another example, the
government in 1998 bailed out the creditors of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital
Many of the questions that arise in the bailout context – such as moral hazard, discretion, and
political favoritism – are similar to those that arise in the context of disaster relief. See, e.g., Howard
Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules Rather than Discretion: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, 33 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 101 (2006). There are, therefore, many parallels between the analysis we
present and the literature on disaster relief. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design
and Terror Victim Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 627 (2003) (identifying important principles for
designing terror-victim relief programs). But there are important differences between disaster relief
and bailouts. Chief among them is the fact that bailouts, properly understood, are designed
exclusively to contain macroeconomic risk, while disaster relief may be defended on humanitarian or
distributive grounds even where it does not reduce externalities or prevent further economic loss.
46

A similar response would be to relax regulations during periods of high unemployment. See
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unemployment, Regulation, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 98 VA.
L. REV. 579 (2011).
47

48

Fischer, supra note 33, at 91.

49

See infra II.D.2.
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Management by persuading all of them to agree to haircuts. The government did
not pay money to anyone, but it did manage to force firms to act against their
inclination. How it did so is not clear. The government has enormous regulatory
power over banks—it can, for example, block mergers and extensions of certain
lines of business. The government might have implicitly bribed banks by promising
to approve future mergers that it would not otherwise have approved; or it might
have implicitly threatened not to approve future mergers that it would otherwise
have approved. In either case, the government effected a bailout.
Or, consider, as a final example, the argument that the government bailed out
the steel industry in 1999 and 2000 by imposing trade barriers on foreign imports.50
The trade barriers artificially raised the price of steel in the United States, which
resulted in greater revenues for the steel industry. This is economically not much
different from taxing consumers and using the proceeds to bail out the industry.
While we focus in his paper on explicit bailouts, it is important to see that if
bailouts are understood in a functional way, they may well be ubiquitous rather
than rare.
C. Direct and Indirect Beneficiaries of Bailouts
As noted above, the beneficiaries of the bailout are not always the direct
recipients of the transfer. Imagine two Banks, X and Y. Bank X owns $100 in
illiquid assets, and owes $90 in the form of a demand deposit to Bank Y. Bank Y has
a single asset, the demand deposit with X worth $90, and owes $80 to its own
depositors. Both banks have equity of $10. During a liquidity crisis, Bank Y might
attempt to withdraw its $90 from Bank X, which would drive X into bankruptcy if it
cannot sell its assets for that much, as is likely. If Bank X collapses and can only
raise, say, $50, to give to Bank Y, then Bank Y will also collapse—because it cannot
afford to pay its depositors.
Suppose the government bails out Bank X by lending it $90. Bank X can repay
Y, and thus stay in business long enough to sell its illiquid assets or obtain new
creditors. Thus, it is easy to see that the government saves Bank X. But the
government also saves Bank Y. By enabling Bank X to pay back Bank Y in full, the
government also enables Bank Y to pay its depositors. The bailout of X is direct; the
bailout of Y is indirect but no less real.
The government could also save X by bailing out Y. If the government lends $80
to Y so that Y can pay back its depositors, then Y may feel no need to withdraw its
$90 from X. In this case the government bails out Y directly, and X indirectly.

Raymond Hernandez, Santorum, Defender of Free Market, Pushed in Congress to Protect Big Steel,
N.Y.
TIMES,
March
1,
2012,
at
A6,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/us/politics/santorum-free-market-defender-used-to-aid-steelindustry.html.
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This distinction is important because even though the actions are functionally
identical, often the public identifies only the direct recipient as the beneficiary of
the bailout, and may put pressure on the government to punish direct recipients but
not to punish indirect recipients. In the first case, for example, the government
might respond to publish pressure by demanding that X pay a high interest rate to
the government, or give it equity. X is penalized, and Y is not, but Y is just as much
a beneficiary of government action as X is.
Insiders and sophisticated commentators, by contrast, are well-aware of this
phenomenon. When the U.S. government participated in the bailout of Mexico in
1994, experts understood that major beneficiaries were U.S. banks, including
Citigroup, whose loans to Mexico were at stake.51 Indeed, stock prices of U.S. banks
with exposure to the crisis responded to announcements of progress and setbacks in
the U.S. bailout talks.52
Similarly, when the government bailed out AIG, it wiped out most of AIG’s
equity, which was politically popular. But the indirect beneficiaries of the bailout—
AIG’s creditors and counterparties—did not suffer any loss in equity. Critics of the
AIG bailout accused the government of engaging in a “backdoor bailout” of AIG’s
counterparties.53 Similarly, the indirect beneficiaries of the GM and Chrysler
bailouts of 2009 were employee-creditors, while shareholders—the nominal direct
beneficiaries—were wiped out.54
D. The Structure of a Bailout
The government has many degrees of freedom when designing a bailout, and can
use this freedom to favor or discriminate against various stakeholders. Imagine a
firm like GM on the brink of default. The government could lend GM enough money
NOMI PRINS, ALL THE PRESIDENTS’ BANKERS (2014) (“Heavy hitters like BankAmerica, Chase
Manhattan, Chemical Banking, Citicorp, Goldman Sachs, and J. P. Morgan…accounted for nearly 74
percent of Latin American exposure, or $40.4 billion. The bailout saved them, and later enabled
them to buy Mexican banks that were weakened as a result. A decade later, foreign banks, led by
Citigroup in the United States, owned 74 percent of Mexican financial assets.”). Rubin’s public
position was that the bailout was a regrettable necessity: “Alan, Larry, and I all opposed making the
holders of Tesobonos whole. But we concluded – I think rightly – that Mexico couldn’t be rescued
without the side effect of helping some investors.” ROBERT RUBIN & JACOB WEISBERG, IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD: TOUGH CHOICES FROM WALL STREET TO WASHINGTON, 11–12 (2004). Not
everyone was convinced. ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL, 34 (2010) (“accusations at the time
that Rubin had actually organized the international bailout in an effort to save Goldman Sachs”).
51

Osman Kilic, M. Kabir Hassan, & David R. Tufte, An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Bank Risk
and the Mexican Peso Crisis, 22 J. ECON. & FIN. 139, 144–45 (1998) (finding that stocks of U.S. banks
with exposure to Mexican loans experienced abnormal positive and negative returns in responses to
announcements of progress and setbacks, respectively, in U.S. bailout talks).
52
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See infra II.E.2.

54

See infra II.D.3.
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to pay off its creditors. This loan benefits those creditors, who otherwise would be
partially repaid from GM’s assets; and shareholders, who retain the value of their
equity. The bailout benefits all creditors.
However, the government could also offer a loan that provides more limited
benefits. For example, it could demand that all creditors receive haircuts, and that
shareholder equity be diluted or even wiped out. It can also discriminate within
groups. In the GM loan, for example, the government ensured that employees as
pension creditors received higher payoffs as a fraction of their claims than other
creditors. Dealers brought a lawsuit claiming that the government discriminated
against them by requiring GM to terminate its contractual relationships with them.
The government also wiped out the shareholders.
The government treated financial institutions with a great deal of variation as
well. Many banks received emergency loans from the Fed that fully preserved
shareholder value. Banks that received TARP money had to submit to various
dilutions of shareholder equity. Bear and AIG shareholders also were subject to
bespoke dilutions. One important issue concerned whether the government should
obtain equity in a firm that it bails out. Before EESA, the government took equity
only from AIG; after EESA, using the authorizations in that statue, the government
received equity from financial institutions into which it pumped TARP money.
While the question whether the government should take equity or not is outside
the scope of this Article, we should note some of the relevant considerations. The
justification for taking equity is that it gives the government, and hence the
taxpayer, the upside if the target firm recovers; this compensates the government
for the risk that it takes. Moreover, equity may give the government control over
the firm, which allows it to influence the firm’s operations and hence maximize the
probability of repayment. And by reducing payoffs to shareholders, equity transfers
may counter moral hazard. But there are also fears that the government will abuse
control of corporations for political purposes. Since World War II, in the United
States (unlike many other countries) the government has avoided taking a
controlling share of equity in corporations because of political opposition toward
government meddling in industry.55 The government can protect itself from default
with devices that are less subject to abuse, like loan covenants. One might also
worry that the government could use emergency conditions to take an excessively
large equity interest because firms that would otherwise go bankrupt lack the
bargaining power that would be necessary to ensure that terms are fair.

See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 389 (1995) (recounting the rise of
government corporations during the world wars and Great Depression, and the subsequent actions
to reverse that trend). The current prohibition on government-controlled corporations is embodied in
the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 31 U.S.C. § 9102 (2012), which prohibits agencies
from establishing or acquiring corporations without congressional consent.
55
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E. Who Makes the Bailout?
Because of their ex post nature, one might think that Congress must make
bailouts by appropriating funds and distributing them to beneficiaries. In fact,
Congress has in a number of statutes delegated the power to make bailouts to other
entities—above all, the Fed. Section 10(b) of the Federal Reserve Act gives the Fed
the power to quasi-bail out banks, and section 13(3) gives the Fed the power to bail
out non-bank financial institutions. The Fed has this power in part as a result of its
unique ability to fund itself from its operations. The FDIC also has a traditional
power to make bailouts by rescuing banks that pose a systemic threat; in these
cases, the FDIC may pay all of the bank’s creditors to the full extent of their claims,
not just depositors who are covered by insurance.56 The FDIC has a fund, paid for
through its regular assessments on banks, that it can draw on to make such
payments. Dodd-Frank authorizes the FDIC to borrow from the Treasury in order to
make bailouts if the fund is depleted.57
The difference between a congressional bailout and an agency bailout is
important because Congress can regulate agency bailouts by putting appropriate
conditions in the statute. Dodd-Frank does just that—by requiring that consulting
and approval take place in the executive branch, and limiting the power of the Fed
to bail out individual firms (as opposed to classes of firms).58 By contrast, any effort
by Congress to regulate itself by issuing restrictions on its own bailouts in advance
runs into time-inconsistency problems. If Congress enacts a statute restricting or
regulating bailouts at time 1, and then enacts another statute at time 2 that
authorizes a bailout, it can explicitly or implicitly repeal the time 1 statute in the
process. Nonetheless, a general bailout statute at time 1 may not be easy to
overturn. An explicit overturning of the statute may be politically embarrassing,
and courts may not recognize an implicit overturning, reasoning instead that the
first statute is meant to structure the second statute.59 There are many analogies to
this style of reasoning; for example, the Supreme Court’s refusal to hold that the
2001 AUMF against Al Qaeda implicitly overturned statutes that regulate
surveillance and other matters.60

12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)) (2012); for a description of how the systemic risk exception has been
used, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-100, REGULATORS’ USE OF SYSTEMIC RISK
EXCEPTION RAISES MORAL HAZARD CONCERNS AND OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO CLARIFY THE PROVISION
(Apr. 2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10100.pdf.
56
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Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 210(n), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n) (2012).

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 203, 1101, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5383, 343
(2012).
58

59

See William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L J. 1215, 1235 (2001).

60

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593–94 (2006).
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F. Some Recent Bailouts
Bailouts might seem extraordinarily rare but they are not. In the table below,
we list ten bailouts from the last forty years—one every four years. The table does
not include the bailout of New York City in 1975, or the various bailouts of
sovereigns—like Mexico in 1995—that benefited American holders of foreign debt.
Arguably, when the Fed lowers interest rates in order to head off a financial crisis—
as it did starting in 2007—it is engaging in a kind of bailout of all firms that, as a
consequence, can borrow money more cheaply than otherwise. However, in popular
usage, bailouts are targeted to individual firms or classes of firms, and we will stick
to that usage.
The bailouts differ in many ways. In some cases, the government bailed out
multiple firms in whole industries—the S&L bailout and the bailouts of 2008-2009.
In other cases, it bailed out single firms. Bailouts took different forms—as cash
transfers, loans, and loan guarantees. Bailouts can also be disguised, which is why
we include the bailout of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 when the
government did not spend any money but may have used an implicit promise of
regulatory forbearance in order to persuade creditors to agree to haircuts.61 The
government bailed out financial firms for the most part, but also bailed out
manufacturing firms and transport firms.
Table 1: Some Recent Bailouts62

61

See supra I.E.

The information in the table is compiled from the following sources. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, CED-76-171, IMPROVED CONTROLS NEEDED OVER FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO
RAILROADS (1976); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PSAD-78-66, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE ACT (1978); Ana J. Schwartz, The Misuse of the Fed’s Discount
Window, 74 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 58 (1992); JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. REEARCH SERV.,
R40005, CHRYSLER CORPORATION LOAN GUARANTEE ACT OF 1979: BACKGROUND, PROVISIONS, AND
COST (2008); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust
Company, in MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE, Part II, Chapter 4 (1998);
Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, 13
FDIC BANKING REVIEW 26 (2000); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-96-123, RESOLUTION
TRUST CORPORATION’S 1995 AND 1994 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (1996); THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING
GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT (1999); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-836, LEGACY AIRLINES MUST
FURTHER
REDUCE
COSTS
TO
RESTORE
PROFITABILITY
(Aug.
2004),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/243741.pdf; Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act §
101(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)); Deborah
Groban Olson, Fair Exchange: Providing Citizen with Equity Managed by a Community Trust, in
Return for Government Subsidies or Tax Breaks for Businesses, 15 CORN. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y. 231,
286-88 (2006); THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT
(Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf; Paul Kiel & Dan
Ngyuen, Bailout Tracker, PROPUBLICA, (Jan 23, 2015) http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/; CONG.
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Year

Beneficiary

Amount Spent or
Loaned by
Government

Outcome

1970

Penn Central
Railroad

$556 Million

Reorganized

1971

Lockheed

$245 Million

Recovered

1974

Franklin Bank

$1.75 Billion

Liquidated

1980

Chrysler

$1.2 Billion

Recovered

1984

Continental Bank

$49.6 Billion

Liquidated

1989

Savings & Loan
Industry

$132 Billion

Liquidated

1998

Long-Term Capital
Management

$0

Liquidated

$6.56 Billion

Industry
recovered

2001

Airline Industry

2008-2009

Financial Sector and
Homeowners

$534 Billion

Industry
recovered

2008

Chrysler & GM

$80 Billion

Reorganized

The table provides a very rough description of the outcome in each case. We
will provide details of several bailouts in Part II, but it is worth pointing out here
that most of the bailouts were at least superficially successful. In most cases, the
government broke even or made substantial profits on loans and other investments;
and the bailed-out firm or industry recovered. But all the bailouts were intensely
controversial. Why they were is the topic of the next part.

OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE USE OF TARP FUNDS IN THE SUPPORT AND
REORGANIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC AUTO INDUSTRY (Sep. 9, 2009); BILL CANIS & BAIRD WEBEL, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41978, THE ROLE OF TARP ASSISTANCE IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF GENERAL
MOTORS, 5–6 (May, 2013), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41978.pdf.
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III.

CASE STUDIES

We discuss below a number of the bailouts in Table 1. As we will see, criticisms
of most of these bailouts fall into four categories. First, critics frequently argue that
a proposed bailout is what we will call “ex post inefficient”—a pure transfer to a
lucky group of stakeholders that does not produce a net social good and wastes the
taxpayers’ dollars. Second, bailouts often appear unfair or discriminatory because
they help one group of people while the government does not help similarly situated
people—stakeholders in other firms that do not receive a bailout. Third, bailouts
might generate moral hazard by creating the expectation that in future other firms
will receive bailouts, an expectation that may distort the incentives of market
agents. Fourth, critics sometimes argue that the government has issued a bailout in
a procedurally irregular way—with insufficient transparency and inadequate
opportunities for stakeholders and others to make their views known about the
wisdom of the bailout or how it should be structured.
A. The Lockheed Bailout
In the early 1970s, Lockheed Corporation, an important aerospace manufacturer
(one of the companies that later merged to form today’s Lockheed Martin), ran into
financial difficulties when a major project ran over budget and one of its suppliers
filed for bankruptcy. Lockheed argued that if it were forced into bankruptcy, its
failure would damage the airline industry and cause massive job losses in
California.63 As the nation’s largest defense contractor,64 Lockheed was also vital to
the war effort in Vietnam. Congress responded to Lockheed’s pleas by enacting the
Emergency Loan Guarantee Act, under which the government provided Lockheed
with a $250 million loan guarantee.
Supporters of the bailout emphasized the macroeconomic costs of bankruptcy.65
President Nixon argued that a Lockheed failure would destroy jobs.66 The Secretary
of Treasury added that Lockheed’s most recent troubles were not its fault but had

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-169300, IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE ACT
(1972), available at http://gao.gov/assets/210/203532.pdf.
63

64

Id. at 6.

Divisions did not follow party lines. Republicans in the Senate voted 27-17 for the bill while
Democrats voted 22-31 and Southern democrats split 9-8 in the Senate. The divisions in the House
were similar. Lockheed Loan Guarantee Bill Cleared on Close Votes, 27 CONG. Q. ALMANAC (1971),
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal71-1252844.
65

Id. (“President Nixon at San Clemente, Calif., May 5 told a news conference the major factor, in
his view, was the unemployment that would be caused by a Lockheed bankruptcy and consequent
abandonment of the L-1011 program.”).
66
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resulted in part from government cancelations of major projects.67 Unions and
banks also warned of the negative macroeconomic effects of a Lockheed failure.68
Critics of a bailout argued that the macroeconomic effects of failure would be
small, while the bailout would be costly for the government. A representative of the
United Auto Workers union testified that the lost production of Lockheed would be
picked up by McDonnell Douglas, which “would be highly advantageous to the
American aerospace worker.”69 A report by the majority staff of the House Banking
and Currency Committee found a “substantial risk of default and loss to the
government in the proposed guarantee.”70
Critics and defenders also argued about the general propriety of bailouts. The
Fed sought permanent authority for the government to issue loan guarantees.71 On
the other side, Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin noted his opposition to “insulating big
business from failure.” He pointed out that none of the more than 10,000 small
businesses that failed in 1970 were being bailed out.72 Other testimony highlighted
the moral hazard problem, noting that the failures at hand raised a presumption of
mismanagement.73
In the end, the bill passed. Ostensibly, it authorized loan guarantees to all
troubled firms whose failure would have systemic effects. The Act created a Loan
Guarantee Board and provided that it could guarantee a loan
only if (1) the Board finds that (A) the loan is needed to enable the borrower to
continue to furnish goods or services and failure to meet this need would
adversely and seriously affect the economy of or employment in the Nation or
any region thereof, (B) credit is not otherwise available to the borrower under
reasonable terms or conditions, and (C) the prospective earning power of the
borrower, together with the character and value of the security pledged, furnish
reasonable assurance that it will be able to repay the loan within the time fixed,

Id. The chairman of Bank of American, a major lender to Lockheed, also testified to Congress that
“to a great extent, the federal government shares responsibility and thus the federal government has
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and afford reasonable protection to the United States; and (2) the lender certifies
that it would not make the loan without such guarantee.74
But Lockheed was the only firm to apply for or receive assistance under the act.75
The amount of guaranteed loans topped out at $245 million in 1974.76 The loan
guarantee was terminated in 1977 as part of a refinancing that replaced the
government-supported loans.77 The government earned $25.5 million in
commitment fees.78
The Lockheed controversy set the terms of the debates for future bailouts. First,
critics thought that the macroeconomic benefits of a bailout would be slim and the
government would lose money. While we do not know whether they were correct on
the first point, they were wrong on the second. Second, critics argued that the
bailout was unfair because other firms did not receive bailouts, and Lockheed
benefited from its political connections. Questions also arose as to whether the
bailout could or should be structured to be distributively fair. Third, the question of
moral hazard arose as participants debated whether Lockheed or the government
was at fault for Lockheed’s financial distress, and whether one bailout would give
rise to additional bailouts.79
B. 1979 Chrysler Bailout
In 1979 Chrysler had lost over a billion dollars. It had negative working capital
and was unable to borrow on the market.80 Congress and the White House
responded by negotiating a bailout program that would inject $1.5 billion of capital
into the firm through a government guarantee. The government agency
administering the guarantee estimated that the failure of Chrysler would “lower
Emergency Loan Guarantee Act § 4, Pub. L. No. 92-70, 85 Stat. 178 (1971) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
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GNP by $5 billion in 1980 and $6 billion in 1981.”81 Between 700,000 and 1 million
jobs and the solvency of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation were also put at
risk.82 The job-loss estimates were challenged by critics who argued that lost
production by Chrysler would be picked up by the other Detroit automakers.83
The bailout took the form of a loan guarantee approved by the Chrysler
Corporation Loan Guarantee Act.84 Up to $1.5 billion was made available in
guarantees. The Act required that additional funds of at least $1.43 billion be raised
from non-federal sources, and that some of those funds would come in the form of
haircuts on existing stakeholders.85 Thus, existing domestic lenders were required
to provide $400 million in new loans and $100 million in concessions on existing
loans. The remaining funds were to be contributed by foreign lenders ($150 million),
state and local governments ($250 million), suppliers and dealers ($180 million),
proceeds from asset sales ($300 million), and the issuance of new equity ($50
million).86 An additional $587.5 million in concessions were required from
employees, primarily in reduced compensation for union employees.87
Chrysler was the nation’s tenth largest company;88 its financial problems posed a
greater risk to the economy than Lockheed’s did. As in Lockheed, the debate about
the wisdom of a bailout centered on ex post efficiency, fairness, moral hazard, and
the likelihood of failure. Ralph Nader noted,
Opponents of the Chrysler bill filled their recitals with arguments that it was
a bad precedent, that it was unfair to thousands of failing small businesses
which are not given federal bail-outs, that the loan guarantee would not be
enough to save Chrysler as a full-line auto manufacturer, that Chrysler could
reorganize and scale down to a smaller, efficient company, and that the
taxpayers shouldn’t be required to do what the banks would not do.89
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However, at least in hindsight, we can say that the bailout was a success: it both
saved Chrysler and generated a profit for the government. Chrysler took $1.2 billion
in guaranteed loans and redeemed them all by 1982.90 In exchange for its
guarantee, the government took a security interest in Chrysler’s assets, and
received an annual 1% guarantee fee. The government also took warrants to
purchase shares that represented 10 to 15% of Chrysler’s common stock. Those
warrants were sold after Chrysler recovered and functioned as an additional $311
million fee that the government collected on its guarantee.91 However, some critics
argue that the government made money on the bailout only because it imposed
import quotas that artificially inflated Chrysler’s sales—in effect, taxing car
buyers.92 If so, the bailout may not have been ex post efficient.
The charge of unfairness cannot be so easily dismissed. Critics saw no sense in
imposing haircuts on creditors and employees in order to transfer value to
shareholders who would have otherwise been wiped out.93 The head of GM criticized
the bailout as favoring a failed competitor: “If you say, ‘O.K., if somebody fails in the
competitive race, then we’re going to bail them out anyway,’ I don’t think that’s in
accordance with what really made this country great.”94 Economist John Kenneth
Galbraith lamented the power of corporations to secure favorable treatment: “Even
the finest and firmest free enterprise principles, we know, can be bent as needed to
pecuniary and corporate need.”95 He also commented that if the bailout was
inevitable, the public should at least have received an ownership stake in the firm.
Finally, worries of moral hazard loomed large. Many of those leveling fairness
objections tied them to moral hazard. A Businessweek editorial argued that the
bailout “would set a dangerous precedent of relieving management, the board of
directors, and the stockholders of responsibility for the company’s good health.”96
Congress sought to address this concern by imposing haircuts on employees and
creditors. Perhaps the moral hazard (and unfairness concerns) raised at the time
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would have been reduced if Congress had imposed a greater cost on shareholders.
But once again the moral hazard claims are at best theoretical possibilities. There is
no evidence that the Chrysler bailout caused other firms to engage in
mismanagement or risky investments.
C. S&L Bailouts
In the 1980s, a large number of bank-like financial institutions known as
Savings & Loans (S&Ls) and Savings Banks collapsed.97 S&Ls (and Savings Banks,
but henceforth we will refer to both types of bank as S&Ls or thrifts) were a type of
bank that mainly served consumers by issuing mortgages to homeowners and
offering checking accounts. They mostly stayed out of commercial lending and
deposit-taking. The thrift industry was a stable and profitable business from the
Depression until the 1970s. In the 1970s, interest rates rose sharply because of
budget deficits, the oil shock, and other adverse market conditions. In addition, the
government permitted money market mutual funds to offer checking-like services to
consumers and to pay them a market interest rate. S&Ls initially lost business to
the mutual funds because they were not permitted to charge a high rate of interest.
The government responded by allowing S&Ls to charge a market interest rate, but
now the problem was that the interest rates demanded by depositors exceeded the
very low interest rates on the 30-year mortgages that the S&Ls had issued when
interest rates were very low. As a result of this squeeze, many S&Ls became
undercapitalized and possibly insolvent.
Congress, state legislatures (which established rules of state S&Ls, as opposed
to nationally chartered S&Ls), and regulators responded in the early 1980s by
further deregulating S&Ls.98 They hoped that by allowing S&Ls to diversify into
different markets, such as commercial real estate, and to offer new types of loans,
like adjustable-rate mortgages, they would enable S&Ls to return to profitability.
Unfortunately, deregulation caused many S&Ls to take on additional risk. Many
S&Ls expanded their operations in order to enter the new markets. To do so, they
needed additional sources of funds, which they obtained by offering increasingly
high interest rates for deposits. Because of deposit insurance, depositors did not pay
attention to the credit risk of the S&Ls in which they put their funds. Many S&Ls
used this money to make risky loans that went sour, and as a consequence
hundreds of S&Ls collapsed.99
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S&L regulators initially tried to rescue failing S&Ls by persuading healthy
S&Ls and banks to buy them.100 Because no one wants to buy a firm with negative
value, the regulators compensated the buyers by offering to excuse them from
various regulatory requirements. However, this strategy just weakened the healthy
institutions, and Congress put an end to it (in the process making the government
liable for breach of contract).101 Congress finally cleaned up the mess by authorizing
regulators to borrow enough funds to pay off depositors and hold the assets of the
failed S&Ls until they could be sold off at market prices. By the end of the crisis,
hundreds of thrifts had failed. The total cost of the rescue has been estimated at
$160 billion.102
While the S&L rescue was widely called a “bailout,” it was not a pure case. As
the economist Lawrence White has argued, the funds appropriated by Congress
were used to pay depositors on the basis of their legal entitlement to governmentsupplied deposit insurance.103 What was distinctive about the S&L rescue was that
the existing insurance fund was not large enough to satisfy the government’s
liabilities, and so Congress was required to appropriate additional funds in order to
make good on them. With some minor exceptions, depositors received insurance
payouts only up to the maximum ($100,000).104 Shareholders received nothing.
Nonetheless, there was a great deal of public outrage directed at the thrifts and
their regulators, which Congress shared.105 The healthy, well-managed thrifts that
did nothing wrong were forced to pay a tax to cover some of the costs of the
insurance payouts.106 The existing regulatory bodies were dissolved and replaced
with new ones. The outrage was probably due to some highly publicized cases of
criminal activity and political corruption, as well as the expensive bill for the
taxpayer that was the result of excessive risk-taking.
The reason that the S&L rescue was called a “bailout” was probably due to the
ex post nature of the government intervention. And the term is not as inaccurate as
White suggests. From an ex ante perspective, the S&L insurance fund was supposed
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to be self-sustaining, like any insurance funds. The premiums paid by S&Ls should
in aggregate suffice to cover losses. The government did not bail out the S&Ls so
much as the insurance fund.
Although the efforts during the 1980s to save the S&Ls industry without using
taxpayer funds was ill-advised and poorly executed, the bailout itself—when it came
in 1989107—seems to have been properly structured. The government was able to
avoid a fire sale of assets by taking control of them and selling them off over a long
period of time. As a result, the S&L crisis did not metastasize into a full-blown
financial crisis despite the thrift industry’s huge share of the mortgage market.
Moreover, the bailout was necessary to ensure that people believed the
government’s deposit guarantee—without which S&Ls, and possibly banks, would
be subject to runs and panics. To address moral hazard, Congress passed legislation
to strengthen supervision of S&Ls.108 The rescue was fair and nondiscriminatory
since it simply ensured that people with legal entitlements to insurance payouts
received them. Shareholders and large creditors did not receive payoffs beyond what
they were entitled to.
The 1989 bailout can also be contrasted to the implicit (failed) bailout through
regulatory forbearance. Because the earlier bailout took the form of secret bargains
between regulators, S&Ls, and banks, it was not debated publicly. By contrast, the
government used regular and public procedures to liquidate the assets of failed
S&Ls after 1989.
The most important lesson of the S&L bailout came from this earlier botched
effort by regulators to rescue banks by promising solvent banks and S&Ls that it
would allow them to reduce capital below regulatory requirements if they purchased
insolvent S&Ls. Congress later reversed this policy, and banks sued, arguing that
the government had breached a contract.109 Arguably, the regulators would not
have resorted to such a desperate and ill-considered measure if they had had access
to sufficient bailout funds. One benefit of a formal statute or policy that approves of
and regulates bailouts is that it may weaken the stigma against bailouts, and in
this way permit regulators to bail out firms when appropriate to do so.
Another questionable feature of the (final) bailout was the determination to tax
healthy thrifts in order to (partially) fund the losses from the deposit fund.110 The
tax was politically popular because it reduced the cost to taxpayers by throwing
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103
Stat. 183 (codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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part of the burden on shareholders of the healthy thrifts. But the healthy thrifts
had done nothing wrong. From an ex ante perspective, the tax informed firms that
they will be penalized if they belong to an industry that is bailed out whether or not
those specific firms acted prudently or imprudently. The effect is to enhance rather
than reduce moral hazard. This is a reminder that temporary political passions—
which often take the effect of wanting to punish a whole industry rather than
specific bad actors—can result in bad policy.
D. 9/11 Airline Bailout
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress authorized around
$15 billion in emergency government funding for the airlines. Under the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA), airlines were given
$5 billion as a direct payment.111 This was framed as compensation for the
reduction in air travel caused by the grounding of flights after the attacks and the
subsequent reduction in air traffic. ATSSSA also authorized the Air Transportation
Safety Board (ATSB) to issue up to $10 billion in further loans or loan guarantees to
protect failing air carriers.112 The ATSB used that authority to issue loan
guarantees to some but not all carriers who applied for them after the attacks.113
Guarantees were provided to America West, American Trans Air, Aloha Airlines,
Evergreen International Airlines, Frontier Airlines, US Airways, and World
Airways for a total value of $1.56 billion.114 Similar to the structure in the Chrysler
bailout, in exchange for those loans the ATSB received warrants in the equity stock
of those carriers. As a result of those warrants, the loan-guarantee arm of the
airline bailout has been profitable for the government.115
Congress did not provide a clear explanation for the airline bailouts.116 One
possibility is that the airlines would have collapsed without a short-term liquidity
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injection from the government because they owed money on their high fixed costs
and suddenly were deprived of revenue from ticket sales. However, if this was the
case, it seems likely that private creditors would have made loans to the airlines;
moreover, the direct transfer part of the bailout would not have been justified.
Another possibility is that the bailout was a form of humanitarian relief for airline
stakeholders, akin to government support for individuals and businesses struck by
a natural disaster like a hurricane. On this view, the bailout was motivated by
moral and political, rather than economic, considerations. The government may also
have worried that even a temporary disruption in airline operations as a result of
bankruptcy might have exacerbated the general economic downturn caused by the
shock of the attack.
On the other hand, the moral hazard effects of the bailout were probably
minimal because of the unpredictability of the attack. The 9/11 attack was not the
sort of disaster that the airlines could have prevented by using ordinary prudence.
And while one might argue that it was unfair to single out the airlines for relief,
Congress provided other forms of relief for other direct victims of the 9/11 attack—
so charges of political favoritism were muted.
The loan-guarantee component of the bailout raises some additional issues. The
government offered these guarantees to struggling airlines that met certain criteria.
Firms applying for the guarantee may have failed for reasons unrelated to 9/11.
Where a mismanaged firm could not be distinguished from a firm that failed
because of 9/11, the loan guarantee would reward mismanagement the same as any
other bailout. This is mitigated a bit by the haircuts and oversight that
accompanied the loan guarantees.
E. 2008-2009 Financial Crisis Bailouts
The financial crisis of 2008 resulted in a large number of bailouts of institutions.
We cannot describe all of them in the space we have, and so will limit ourselves to a
few of the most important.
The immediate cause of the financial crisis was the collapse of housing prices,
but the severity of the crisis was due to financial innovations that had concentrated
risk in major financial institutions.117 Most financial institutions were exposed in
various ways to collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and related securities whose
value was a function of underlying mortgages on houses and other secured loans.
Some institutions held these securities on their books; many institutions also used
them as collateral for short-term loans in the repo market; still others guaranteed
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them. Although sophisticated investors understood that housing prices could not
rise forever, they did not understand that the models used to predict the value of
the CDOs were based on excessively optimistic assumptions about housing prices,
with the result that people could not calculate the value of the CDOs when
mortgages began to default at a rate that no one anticipated.
Other factors played a role as well. Investors had sought safe, high-yielding
investments and CDOs offered higher rates than similarly rated securities. Ratings
agencies gave CDOs high ratings because they, too, did not understand the
assumptions underlying them. The demand for CDOs drove mortgage originators to
lower underwriting standards so that they could sell more mortgages, and mortgage
packagers to accept these high-risk mortgages. Meanwhile, investment banks and
other financial institutions took on ever more leverage.
The financial crisis was a classic downward spiral. As mortgage defaults
increased, and people realized that many CDOs would default, lenders refused to
accept them as collateral except at a steep discount. Financial firms that borrowed
in the repo market could continue to borrow only by posting higher levels of
collateral or finding more liquid collateral like treasuries. The most highly
leveraged firms ran out of collateral, and could no longer borrow. This meant that
they had to sell their CDOs and related assets in fire sales, which drove down their
prices. Indeed, all firms facing liquidity shortages sought to unload their CDOs, but
because everyone was acting the same, there were no buyers.
As the most highly leveraged firms collapsed, the panic spread to safer firms.
Even banks, which depend mostly on deposits rather than the repo market, began
to experience runs. Lenders (including bank lenders) were afraid of lending to a
firm exposed to CDOs because they could not determine whether the CDOs would
default or not, and thus whether potential borrowers would be able to repay. AIG,
an insurance company, faced bankruptcy because it had guaranteed CDOs and had
invested in mortgage-related securities. At the height of the crisis, banks refused to
lend to each other or anyone else. The crisis ended when the Fed, FDIC, and other
government agencies made loans to the market. Some of the toxic assets were taken
onto the balance sheets of these agencies, which have been able to hold them to
maturity.
During the financial crisis, in the fall of 2008 and winter of 2009, the press
reported that the government was engaging in numerous “bailouts.” In fact, many of
the transactions that were labeled bailouts were not bailouts. Let us distinguish
several types of transactions.
1. Fannie/Freddie
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The Federal National Mortgage Association (better known as Fannie Mae) and
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) are hybrid publicprivate entities often referred to as Government Sponsored Entities or GSEs.118
The two entities, chartered by acts of Congress but privately owned,119 provide
support to the secondary market for mortgages. They purchase mortgages from
lenders, put them into pools, and sell securities backed by those pools. The
securities entitle the holders to a cash flow based on the principal and interest
payments due on the underlying mortgages. Fannie and Freddie then guarantee
those cash flows – providing insurance against defaults. In exchange, they charge a
guarantee fee. Separately, Fannie and Freddie held large investment portfolios
including mortgages and mortgage-based assets. The result of these activities was
to provide liquidity to the mortgage market and, thus, at least in theory, fulfill their
missions of providing stability and promoting access to mortgage markets.
When the housing market collapsed in 2007 and 2008, Fannie and Freddie
began to experience record-setting losses. As mortgage defaults mounted, the
entities were hit by escalating obligations on the guarantees. By the summer of
2008 each entity had lost billions of dollars. Default by Fannie and Freddie became
a real possibility.
Such a default was likely to create a feedback loop that accelerated losses. The
default of Fannie and Freddie would directly reduce the liquidity in the mortgage
market and signal that further liquidity support was unlikely. Banks would then
originate fewer mortgages, resulting in fewer home sales and a further decline in
housing prices, and further defaults on mortgages guaranteed by Fannie and
Freddie.
This had systemic implications. Because Fannie and Freddie had such massive
holdings in the secondary mortgage market, many commentators believed that their
failure would significantly deepen the housing market collapse. As events would
turn out to reveal, creditors and counterparties were massively exposed to mortgage
derivatives, and thus, if Fannie and Freddie failed, would suffer enormous losses
that would reduce liquidity outside of the mortgage market.120
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At the same time, there was an open question about whether the government
had guaranteed the debt of Fannie and Freddie in the first place. Although no
explicit guarantee had been made, market participants generally operated under
the assumption that the government would back Fannie and Freddie if they
defaulted and the debt traded at a discount that reflected at least some level of
guarantee.121 For our analysis, this fact places the case somewhere between ex ante
insurance and a true bailout. On the one hand, an explicit guarantee is no different
from ex ante insurance. But this guarantee was uncertain. The legal basis for
enforcing it was weak at best.122 It is probably more accurate to characterize the
status quo as an expectation that a bailout would be provided rather than as an
actual legal entitlement. And – even if an entitlement to the implicit guarantee
existed —its contours and the mechanism for implementing it were unstated and
subject to discretion.
Given the implicit promise, many worried that a default by Fannie and Freddie
would send a major negative signal about government creditworthiness (or, more
specifically, its willingness to selectively default) on its general obligations. This
ended up being a major reason given by the government for launching a bailout.123
The overall transaction occurred in several steps. The first step was intended to
be a preventative move to avoid the need for further bailouts. In June of 2008,
Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA), which gave
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necessary by the ambiguities in the GSE Congressional charters, which have been perceived to
indicate government support for agency debt and guaranteed MBS. Our nation has tolerated these
ambiguities for too long, and as a result GSE debt and MBS are held by central banks and investors
throughout the United States and around the world who believe them to be virtually risk-free.
Because the U.S. Government created these ambiguities, we have a responsibility to both avert and
ultimately address the systemic risk now posed by the scale and breadth of the holdings of GSE debt
and MBS.”); Henry M. Paulson, Remarks on Financial Rescue Package and Economic Update, Nov.
12, 2008, available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1265.aspx.
(“Eight weeks ago, Treasury took responsibility for supporting the agency debt securities and the
agency MBS through a preferred stock purchase agreement that guarantees a positive net worth in
each enterprise – effectively, a guarantee on GSE debt and agency MBS. We also established a credit
facility to provide the GSEs the strongest possible liquidity backstop. As the enterprises go through
this difficult housing correction we will, as needed and promised, purchase preferred shares under
the terms of that agreement. The U.S. government honors its commitments, and investors can bank
on it.” ).
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Treasury the power to make investments to shore up Fannie and Freddie.124 It also
created the Federal Housing Finance Agency and gave it the power to place Fannie
and Freddie into conservatorships or receiverships.125
Just a few months later, the FHFA – working with Treasury and the Fed –
exercised its power to place the entities into conservatorship and Treasury used its
new investment power to inject massive capital in the form of preferred equity. The
documents governing the bailout evolved through amendment as the crisis
unfolded, but ultimately Treasury made a commitment to provide unlimited funds
to guarantee liabilities through 2012.126 The plan also included repayment terms
and a requirement to shrink the investment portfolios of the entities. As part of the
repayment, Fannie and Freddie had to pay a quarterly dividend at a 10% annual
rate on the amount that Treasury had invested. In August of 2012 the terms were
amended again to replace the dividend payment with a “net-income sweep.” This
meant that instead of paying Treasury a 10% dividend on its investment, each firm
pays a dividend equal to that firm’s positive net worth (defined as total assets less
total liabilities).127 The effect is that all net income gets paid to Treasury every
quarter. That essentially wiped out the remaining interest of all equity holders.128
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The various stages represent some of the different types of bailouts and bailoutlike actions that the government can use to address the financial difficulties of
systemically important institutions.
The law as it stood before HERA provided vague conservatorship authority that
might be viewed as a grant of bailout authority.129 While the government denied
that it would bail out Fannie or Freddie, the market seems to have assumed either
that the law provided bailout authority or that Congress would act if necessary.
By contrast, HERA was an ex post bailout statute. Once the crisis was
imminent, Congress took ex post actions to limit the impact of the crisis. To be sure,
HERA did not implement a bailout; rather it authorized the government to
implement a bailout. The statute signaled that the government was standing
behind the debt of Fannie and Freddie.130 In this way, the Congressional
authorization can be viewed as correcting for Congress’s ex ante failure to create
sufficient bailout authority.
The crucial aspects of the bailout were an injection of capital through preferred
equity that had repayment priority junior to all debt but senior to equity and
federal control through the FHFA appointed conservator.131 These were pure ex post
bailout measures taken by the executive branch.
The net-income sweep of 2012 can be viewed in several different lights. On one
account, it was just one part of a larger orderly resolution plan to wind down the

The exact contours of that authority are at the heart of the disputed claims in the current
litigation. The district court in one of the cases said this much:
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Perry Capital LLC v. Lew 2014 WL 4829559 at *20 (D.D.C. Sep. 30, 2014). This will no doubt be
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firms.132 On another, it might be viewed as an ex post measure to impose a “haircut”
so as to minimize moral hazard. Or, in the view of unhappy shareholders, it was a
politically motivated transfer of wealth from equity to the government.133
With regard to ex post efficiency, Fannie and Freddie have recovered and the
government made money on the rescue. The magnitude of the profit for the
government is difficult to calculate because of changes in accounting rules and
because of the complicated effects of tax credits which both facilitated repayment of
the loan and reduced tax revenues. Profit measures aside, the bailout prevented a
more significant collapse of the real estate market and so it is difficult to argue that
it was inefficient. That is, of course, not to say that no other better bailout options
existed.
The moral hazard complaints are once again salient. By rescuing Freddie and
Fannie’s creditors, the government confirmed that investors who disbelieved the
government’s no-bailout vow were correct. Critics feared that the bailout thus set
the stage for endless recurrence of the too-big-to-fail phenomenon—that creditors
will overinvest in large firms whose collapse would cause a systemic crisis because
they expect that those firms will be bailed out.134 However, it is possible that this
message was muted by the specific purposes of housing legislation—to subsidize
mortgages—which may not be generalizable to other settings.
Unfairness concerns and potential for political abuse are the subject of current
litigation over the net-income sweep.135 Plaintiffs claim that the government took
value from equity in violation of their legal rights because creditors were fully

The creditors of Fannie and Freddie worried that the firms could suffer future distress under the
pressure of the 10% dividend obligations to Treasury. Nick Timiraos, Fannie, Freddie Stuck in a
Dividends
Circle,
WALL
S T.
J.,
(Mar.
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2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704615504576172420039570798. Both Fannie and
Freddie had repeatedly increased their obligations to Treasury by borrowing funds to keep current
on the dividend obligation. Badawi & Casey, supra note 16, at 8. The actions of 2012 addressed this
by eliminating that obligation and putting in place resolution plan that would protect creditors while
the firms were wound down. Id. at 8-9.
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compensated.136 Other critics of the bailouts argued that the government should
have provided support to homeowners rather than to financial institutions.137
From the standpoint of process, one can argue that the bailouts were
procedurally fair because they were publicly debated in Congress. On the other
hand, litigants challenging the bailout allege that “The Government’s
conservatorship plan was hatched in secrecy and gave the Companies no choice but
to accept Government control.”138 They argue that public statements surrounding
the passage of HERA suggested that the entities were financially sound.139 And
then the government sprung the bailout package on the companies. The CEO of
Fannie stated, “[W]e were given 24 hours to accede to a government takeover – or
else the government would effectively go to war against the company.”140 These
claims are subject to litigation.141 The litigation itself serves process values by
forcing the government to provide a public defense of its bailout choices.
2. Banks, Investment Banks, and Related Institutions
FDIC insurance. Most commercial banks pay for deposit insurance from the
FDIC. When banks fail, the FDIC compensates depositors. This type of
compensation is not a “bailout” because the banks and depositors pay for an ex ante
insurance scheme and the banks submit to regulation.142 However, the FDIC also
possesses statutory authority to cover depositors above the insurance limit (which
was then $100,000) in emergencies.143 The FDIC used that authority to raise the
limit to $250,000 for existing deposits, and to guarantee certain other forms of bank
debt.144 Because this intervention was ex post, saved many banks from runs, and
prevented many bank creditors from defaults, it fits our definition of a bailout. It
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was an agency-led bailout rather than a congressional bailout because the FDIC
relied on existing statutory authority.
Discount lending to commercial banks. The Fed has statutory authority to make
loans to commercial banks.145 During the financial crisis, the Fed made loans
through its discount window and (as described below) through broad-based
facilities. Fed discount window-lending is in principle routine: it is always open to
banks that experience temporary liquidity difficulties. But, in the context of the
crisis, discount-window lending also resembled bailout lending. Like the FDIC, the
Fed lent widely to banks experiencing liquidity difficulties, and in this way rescued
banks and their creditors. The loans were also ex post; like the FDIC emergency
loans that exceeded the $100,000 limit, banks did not pay for them in the form of ex
ante premiums. Discount-window lending was supplemented with advances from
Federal Home Loan Banks, which was also a form of ex post lending.146
Fed broad-based facilities. The Fed also established numerous broad-based
credit facilities through which it lent money to classes of borrower that satisfied
certain eligibility criteria. Some of these facilities supplied credit to commercial
banks by advancing loans against CDOs.147 Others relied on the Fed’s emergency
power to make loans to non-banks under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.
The Primary Credit Dealer Facility advanced overnight credit to primary dealers
(mostly, the major investment banks) against various types of collateral, including
CDOs. Other facilities, notably the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility,
enabled the Fed to advance funds for longer periods of time against toxic assets.148
Still other facilities provided credit to money market funds and non-financial
institutions that relied on the commercial paper market.149 Virtually all of these
facilities provide bailouts in the sense that the money was supplied ex post to firms
that faced financial difficulties and had not paid premiums that entitled them to
loans.150
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The Bear Stearns transaction. In March 2008, creditors cut off credit to Bear
Stearns, a major investment bank. The Fed rescued Bear by arranging for its sale to
JP Morgan. Because JP Morgan did not want to own Bear’s toxic assets, the Fed set
up an entity called Maiden Lane, which bought those assets, financed by a $1.15
billion loan from JP Morgan and a $28.82 billion loan from the Fed. Bear Stearns
shareholders were paid $2 per share, later increased to $10.151 The Fed relied on its
section 13(3) powers. The rescue was a bailout because it was ex post, and it
ensured that Bear’s creditors were paid in full. Indeed, even Bear’s shareholders
received some value.
The AIG transaction. In September of 2008, creditors stopped lending to AIG, a
large insurance company. Creditors lost confidence in AIG because it had issued
credit default swaps (CDS) on CDOs, and had speculated in mortgage-based
securities in its securities lending program. Under the terms of its contracts with
counterparties, AIG was required to post collateral as the ratings of the CDOs
declined; this in turn depleted AIG’s liquidity, which caused ratings agencies to
downgrade AIG. The downgrades then required AIG to post more collateral,
resulting in a downward spiral. The Fed issued a series of large loans to rescue
AIG.152 It financed Maiden Lane II, which purchased the mortgage-backed
securities, and Maiden Lane III, which purchased CDOs from AIG’s CDS
counterparties.153 This rescue was a bailout because it was a discretionary ex post
loan, and it ensured that AIG’s creditors were paid in full. AIG’s shareholders also
retained some value in their shares.
Equity injections into banks. On October 3, 2008, President Obama signed the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, which created the Troubled Assets Relief
Plan (TARP).154 This program made available $700 billion to purchase toxic assets
or invest in financial institutions. More than $200 billion of this money was
committed to the Capital Purchase Program, through which Treasury bought
preferred stock or senior debt from banks, including large loan guarantees for
Citibank and Bank of America.155 Unlike earlier bailouts, the funds for these
bailouts were appropriated by Congress rather than lent by the Fed or another
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agency. Thus, Congress itself acted ex post to rescue the banks, and in doing so
ensured that their creditors were protected.
Assistance to homeowners. The government put in place a number of
programs to aid homeowners during the financial crisis, the most significant of
which was the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP).156 The Treasury
committed $75 billion of TARP funds to provide incentives (typically a few hundred
or thousand dollars per loan) to loan servicers to renegotiate mortgages with
homeowners who could not make payments, as well as to the investors who own the
mortgages, and to the homeowners themselves if they made payments under the
renegotiated mortgages.157 Under the terms of the program, the loan servicer
reduces mortgage payments, plus taxes and insurance, to 31 percent of the
homeowner’s income by cutting the interest rate, extending the period of the loan,
and/or shifting payments to the conclusion of the loan in the form of a balloon
payment.158 So far, about one million homeowners have benefited from HAMP
loans.159 Although HAMP was not described as a bailout in public debates, it fits the
definition of a bailout, albeit only a partial bailout. HAMP indirectly (and partially)
bailed out qualified homeowners by reducing their liability and extending the loan
term so that they do not default because of liquidity problems.
Treasury showed little enthusiasm for bailing out homeowners; it was
prodded to do so by Congress.160 The reason appears to be that Treasury believed
that bailing out financial institutions was a simpler and more direct way of
addressing the financial crisis.161 Once credit was flowing again, lenders and
homeowners would voluntarily renegotiate their loans. Thus, the government would
directly bail out banks but homeowners would receive indirect bailouts. Whether or
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not Treasury was correct, this approach was politically controversial. The public
viewed banks as wrongdoers (even though many banks had done nothing wrong)
and homeowners as victims (even though many homeowners had deliberately
agreed to risky and expensive mortgages). Under HAMP, the government provided
direct (partial) bailouts to both creditors and homeowners.
3. Automobile Companies
In the fall of 2008, the big-three American automakers – Ford, GM, and Chrysler
– were in trouble. A long-term decline in their market share had been compounded
by a dramatic reduction in the overall demand for cars.162 The firms needed to be
restructured or possibly liquidated. But while Ford had taken on financing prior to
the financial crisis, GM and Chrysler had no realistic means of raising capital in the
market once the crisis began. In order to avoid an abrupt collapse of the firms, the
government provided a bailout. The arguments in favor of a bailout painted a
doomsday scenario where the failure of any one of the three automakers would
cause the collapse of their vast network of connected suppliers thus endangering the
operations of the other two.163 In its extreme version, this scenario would put over
three million jobs at risk at a time when the economy was already struggling.164
The government’s initial response in late 2008 was a stopgap measure.165 GM,
Chrysler, and their financing arms received over $20 billion in TARP funds.166 The
more systematic bailout came in 2009 in the structured reorganization of the firms
through the formal process of the federal Bankruptcy Code with tens of billions of
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dollars of financing provided by the U.S. and Canadian Governments.167 The total
investment by the U.S. Treasury approximated $80 billion.168
The auto payments are plain bailouts. The government injected capital to prop
up insolvent firms where no legal entitlement existed. The debate over whether
they were “good” bailouts has focused on the themes that are now familiar. First,
critics claim that the bailouts were unnecessary support for two failed companies
that did not present real systemic risk.169 Under this view the government bailed
out insolvent firms with no strong rationale. Like the other bailouts, the bite of this
critique is once again softened by subsequent events.170 The auto industry has
experienced a major recovery and the Treasury has recovered a sizeable portion of
its investment.171 To say that the government was not fully compensated addresses
profitability but does not answer the efficiency question. Returns to other
stakeholders may have offset any loss the government took on the transaction. Even
conservative estimates suggest that if viewed merely as a jobs program, the bailout
was inexpensive.172
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Critics also argued that the bailouts created moral hazard.173 Ford planned and
obtained market financing for its restructuring earlier and did not ask for
bailouts.174 Chrysler and GM did not. And so strong arguments can made that GM
and Chrysler failed not because of the financial crisis but because they had been
mismanaged. The rescue might then discourage managers in the future from
making painful adjustments to financing or operations.
The government tried to address this problem by wiping out equity and imposing
steep haircuts on senior creditors (who may also have been in a position to force the
firms to restructure themselves). But it also protected employees by ensuring that
the union pensions received valuable equity in the reorganized firms and significant
compensation for many of their claims. The union employees, through the Voluntary
Employment Beneficiary Association (VEBA), were well compensated for the claims.
The VEBA received a large stake (in the form of 17.5% of common stock and
additional preferred stock and warrants) in the new reorganized GM and had a
large chunk of its claims assumed by the new entity.175 For Chrysler, the outcome
was similar. Chrysler was sold to an entity controlled by Fiat and financed by the
United States. Chrysler’s private secured creditors received cash amounting to
about 29 cents on the dollar. Many general unsecured creditors receive little or
nothing while the Chrysler VEBA had many of its claims assumed by the new
entity and received a 55% equity stake in the new firm.176
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This decision raised howls. During the years leading up to the bailouts, one of
the main competitive disadvantages for the big three automakers was their labor
costs. Compared with the production of transplant firms – foreign firms with
production operations in the United States – the American labor costs were 45%
higher.177 The incentives for the unions to bargain with other stakeholders to avoid
failure are dramatically reduced when they are immune to the costs of the failure.
Unions have no incentive to avoid deals that put the firm in a precarious position.178
Critics of the bailouts also complained about their fairness. They argued that
GM and Chrysler were chosen for bailouts because of political motivations rather
than any assessment that bailing them out was socially optimal.179 Even supporters
of the bailout suggest that the necessity of the bailout was questionable at the
time.180 These general objections fold into general process criticisms against TARP
in general. The decisions to use TARP funds were made by the executive branch
behind closed doors without full public vetting and the motivations for those
decisions were difficult for outside observers to assess.
Critics also argued that the government acted unfairly by protecting the claims
of union employees at the expense of senior creditors and other unsecured
creditors.181 In both the GM and Chrysler bankruptcies the companies were sold in
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“363 sales” (the bankruptcy term for the common sale or auction of assets)182 where
the procedures essentially required any bidder to agree to the payout structure as a
condition to participating in the auction. In a 363 sale, there are bidding procedures
that dictate how the auction will be run and who will be allowed to participate.183
For both GM and Chrysler, those procedures specified that to participate in the
auction a bidder had to agree to assume specified liabilities and agree to grant the
VEBAs the prescribed equity stake. In response to objections, the bidding
procedures were amended to allow bids from any firm that “after consultation with
the Creditors’ Committee, the U.S. Treasury and the UAW, [was] determined by the
Debtors in the exercise of their fiduciary duties to be a Qualified Bidder.”184 This
was a hollow exception. No potential outside bidder would have access to the full
information about the assets necessary to make a firm offer to trigger a duty to be
considered.185 No bidder requested to be excused from the procedures.
In the Chrysler case, a dissenting member of the senior lending group objected to
the sale process.186 The secured loans had been made through a loan syndicate. The
relationship between the participating lenders, as is common, was governed by an
agreement that provided for certain decisions to be made by a vote and for actions
to be carried out by an appointed representative of the group (the administrative
agent). An overwhelming majority of participating lenders voted in favor of
supporting the Chrysler sale. Thus, the loan group did not object.
The wrinkle was that that majority of participating lenders who voted in favor of
the reorganization had also received TARP funds from Treasury. The dissenting
creditors alleged that the government’s influence over these TARP recipients
discouraged the latter from raising objections to the government’s plan.187 These
objections of the dissenting creditors, however, failed to stop the sale from being
consummated.188
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The best defense of these structures is that no other bidder existed and so the
bidding procedures had no real effect.189 The counterargument is a procedural one:
the entire point of having an auction is to test such claims about the market.
Bankruptcy law places a large premium on market tests190 and procedures that
exclude market participants defeat the purpose of the test. Because of the process
followed, the critics argue, we will never know the answers to questions about other
bidders.191
A more general defense of the bankruptcy process is that the government
intervention made no one worse off. GM and Chrysler would have collapsed without
government intervention and the government bought these firms. Like any buyer,
the government was free to do what it wanted with firms it bought.192 When the
government gave the VEBA a 55% stake in Chrysler, the action had no impact on
the rights of other creditors.
That argument has some weight if the question is one of proper bankruptcy
procedure. Perhaps a buyer is free to give away value to anyone it chooses.193
Things are less clear, however, when the government intervenes in an emergency.
The government will always be the dominant and essential creditor in a bailout
(thus, the lender of last resort label). Bailout policy is then a question of how the
government should exercise its power when it has that leverage as a monopolist. An
optimal bailout policy will prevent the government from abusing its power. Through
that lens, the complaints of political favoritism are more troubling.
These questions bleed into the fourth area of concern: process. These bailouts
were orchestrated by the administration under the general TARP authority, not by
Congress. There was no legislation from Congress in favor of an auto bailout – to
the contrary an initial auto bailout legislation proposal died in the Senate on
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December 12, 2008.194 The bailouts were negotiated in secret. While approval by the
bankruptcy courts was necessary, the courts were confronted with a negotiated deal
that they were reluctant to disturb in the midst of a crisis.
Litigation after the crisis has, however, given courts an opportunity to revisit the
government’s actions. A lawsuit against the government was brought by auto
dealers whose agreements with Chrysler and GM were terminated in the
bankruptcy.195 These dealers claim that the government used its leverage to force
GM and Chrysler to terminate many of their dealership agreements. The
termination of those agreements is unquestionably legal under the bankruptcy
code.196 The question is whether that termination becomes an unconstitutional
taking when the government forces the private party to take the action. The Federal
Circuit recently held that a coerced termination that caused damage would be a
taking.197 But the court’s language suggests that a high burden awaits plaintiffs on
repleading:
Absent an allegation that GM and Chrysler would have avoided bankruptcy
but for the government’s intervention and that the franchises would have had
value in that scenario, or that such bankruptcies would have preserved some
value for the plaintiffs’ franchises, the terminations actually had no net
negative economic impact on the plaintiffs because their franchises would
have lost all value regardless of the government action.198
This standard might block the worst forms of government abuse—for example,
where the government used its influence over stakeholders to force the companies
into bankruptcy and then structured the bankruptcy to favor certain parties. But it
leaves open more subtle forms of abuse. For example, imagine that the government
offered to finance a reorganization of the firms on the condition that certain
stakeholders benefit at the expense of others. Even if the disfavored stakeholders
receive a higher payout than they would have in bankruptcy, such favoritism would
be objectionable. And, of course, the dealers’ legal theory provides courts with no
authority to question the wisdom of the decision to bail out.
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F. Lessons
Many commentators believed that the bailouts rewarded risky investments, and
depleted the public treasury without creating any benefits. Were these beliefs
correct? To answer this question, we disaggregate the various complaints.
1. Ex Post Efficient
One question raised by a bailout is whether it is necessary—whether it advances
a public goal. The usual justification for bailouts is that they create a
macroeconomic benefit: the avoidance of the social costs associated with
unemployment and underuse of capital. The usual complaint is that they are mere
transfers to favored groups. Thus, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a
socially desirable bailout is a plausible pie-expanding macroeconomic benefit, or
what we have called ex post efficiency.
Let us start with financial institutions, which provide a better case for bailouts
than non-financial institutions do. Economists divide struggling financial
institutions into two categories: solvent firms that face a liquidity crisis, and
insolvent firms. A solvent firm faces a liquidity crisis when it cannot borrow enough
money to fund its operations, and so must sell off assets at fire-sale prices. The
returns on these sales may be low enough to drive the firm into insolvency. For
more than a century, it has been basic doctrine, attributed to the British
commentator Walter Bagehot,199 that the central bank, or other government
institutions, should lend to solvent but illiquid firms. The additional liquidity
enables the firm to survive while it sells off its assets gradually at their true value
or obtains credit from the private market. Although there is disagreement on what
the terms of such a rescue loan should be, there is little doubt that such a loan is ex
post efficient.200 The reason is that the loan costs the government almost nothing,
and it will be fully repaid, while the loan prevents the contagion effects of the firm’s
collapse. If the firm’s creditors collapse as well, then they too must sell off assets at
fire sale prices, and they and other firms will stop lending. The sudden withdrawal
of credit from the economy has huge macroeconomic costs.201 Businesses stop
borrowing and fire employees; consumers stop buying.
The treatment of insolvent financial firms is more complicated. Economists
worry that if the government bails out insolvent firms, then creditors will make
excessively risky loans. But this is a problem with ex ante incentives, to be
discussed below, not ex post efficiency. From an ex post perspective, the only
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question for the government is whether the collapse of the firm will result in
contagion that produces macroeconomic costs. If the answer is yes—which usually
depends on the firm being large and interconnected, or “systemically risky”—then
the government should rescue the firm, or arrange that its creditors are paid in full
(or at least adequately).
The case for bailing out non-financial firms is more difficult still. As a general
matter, the collapse of a non-financial firm will not hurt the credit system, just
because (by definition) non-financial firms are not part of the credit system. If a
widget-manufacturer collapses, its creditors will lose money, but most creditors are
diversified enough that their losses will not ramify throughout the financial system;
and if they do, the usual response is to rescue the creditors, not the widgetmanufacturer. Still, some non-financial firms may be large enough that their
collapse will produce significant macroeconomic costs. If, for example, a firm with a
huge number of employees and suppliers collapses, the resulting macroeconomic
shock—loss of employment and spending—could have contagious effects. The
employees stop spending, causing other businesses to collapse; they default on their
mortgages, causing banks to collapse; and so on. The difficulty with these types of
bailouts is that they can be a disguised method for making transfers to favored
interests.202 That difficulty can be seen most starkly in the 2009 auto bailouts,
which were widely criticized as involving political favoritism.203 The lesson from all
of this is that the more distant the firm is from the credit markets the more
skeptical we should be of a decision to bail it out.204
A striking fact about the 2007-2008 rescues is that nearly all of them were ex
post efficient. Most of the rescues followed the Bagehot dictum: most of the financial
institutions suffered liquidity shortages but were otherwise solvent. The loans to
them were repaid in full.205 The government continues to earn returns on its Fannie
and Freddie bailout and is likely to come out well ahead.
However, a profitable bailout is not the same as a socially optimal bailout. Every
bailout raises numerous choices as to how it is structured: what the rate of interest
should be, the term, the collateral, and so on. It is appropriate to criticize even a
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profitable bailout if it could have been structured so as to provide a greater benefit
to the public.
2. Fairness/Discrimination
A second source of controversy for bailouts is that they often seem arbitrary and
unfair. In every case study that we examined, a critic of the bailout asked why one
firm—Lockheed or Chrysler, for example—received a bailout while thousands of
other firms in financial distress did not. During the financial crisis in 2008, critics
asked why Bear and AIG were saved but not Lehman, and why Wall Street firms
were saved while most ordinary people were allowed to default on their mortgages.
Questions of fairness also arise about how bailouts are structured. Many
creditors of General Motors and Chrysler believed that the government showed
preference for union members. In a recent lawsuit, shareholders of AIG, whose
equity was diluted by the government rescue, complained that AIG was treated
more harshly than the other rescued firms, which were not required to disgorge
equity to the government. Even critics of AIG wonder whether it was fair of the
government to use AIG’s assets to pay off its counterparties in full—leading some
commentators to accuse the government of engaging in a “backdoor” (that is,
hidden) bailout of the counterparties, which included Goldman Sachs, among
others.206 Indeed, critics have charged that the government showed favoritism to
Goldman, Citigroup, and other Wall Street firms with which government officials
had close ties.207
3. Moral Hazard
The major worry about bailouts is that they can produce socially undesirable
incentives. If bailouts occur with regularity, then private agents will predict that
they will occur whenever the conditions associated with bailouts occur. If agents can
predict who will receive bailouts, and under what conditions, with reasonable
accuracy, then they will change their behavior in various ways.
The prospect of bailouts can lead to different types of bad behavior. If the market
anticipates that, consistently with Bagehot, solvent but illiquid firms will receive
bailouts, then creditors will not take into account the liquidity risk of borrowers—
that is, including both the liquidity of borrowers’ assets and the care with which
management handles liquidity issues. If the market anticipates that the
government will bail out insolvent firms, then creditors will also not concern
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themselves with credit risk. A derivative worry is that borrowers will maneuver
themselves into the position in which they are likely to be rescued because this
reduces their cost of credit. The “too-big-too-fail” problem is one manifestation of
this concern. If everyone knows that the government will bail out only large firms,
then creditors will reduce credit costs only for large firms. To obtain the benefit of
lower credit costs, firms will grow beyond an efficient scale. Finally, if government
lending is too generous, borrowers will be reluctant to switch to private lenders as
the credit markets improve.
Worries about moral hazard played a significant role in the government’s
response to the financial crisis, but the government acted inconsistently. The
government allowed Lehman to fail and imposed harsh terms on AIG at least in
part—according to some—to counter moral hazard.208 But the government also gave
generous terms—low interest rates—to numerous other financial institutions.209
While some authors make a virtue of the government’s inconsistency by arguing
that uncertainty about whether one will receive a bailout reduces moral hazard,210
the proper method for inducing uncertainty is to randomize rather than favor the
politically connected, who know who they are. Moreover, inconsistency will harm
the primary goal of the government, which is to restore confidence in the financial
system. That was the lesson of the failure of Lehman, which was unexpected
because the government had earlier saved Bear Stearns, and precipitated the
massive flight to liquidity that almost destroyed the financial system.
Bagehot counsels a relatively high rate of interest to deter moral hazard, but
central banks have generally disregarded this advice because they worry that if
they charge high rates, borrowers will refuse to borrow, or will wait too long before
borrowing.211 This worry might seem paradoxical since it implies that borrowers
would voluntarily turn down loans in the middle of a liquidity crisis, when credit is
tight. But there is a reason for this. Banks and other financial institutions worry
that if they accept an emergency loan, the market will infer that they are insolvent
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or on the brink of insolvency.212 So while the government may lend to them in the
short term, they will lose access to private credit in the medium- and long-term.
During the 2007-2008 financial crisis, banks dealt with the problem of stigma by
refusing loans from the discount window and instead borrowing in more hidden
ways—by seeking more depositors protected by the FDIC, borrowing from Federal
Home Loan Banks, and relying on the Fed’s broad-based facilities.213 But all this
suggests that the moral hazard problem is partly self-correcting and largely
exaggerated. If firms are penalized with stigma, they will not use emergency loans
except as a last resort, and most likely only when there is a full-blown financial
crisis.214 And the probability of a full-blown financial crisis itself appears
exceedingly small. There have been only two in the United States over the last 80
years. The latest financial crisis was anticipated by no one. If the probability that
emergency loans will be needed is exceedingly small, then the availability of such
loans can only trivially affect the ex ante incentives of banks.
4. Process
Bailouts almost always take place in emergency conditions, with the result that
they occur in a rush, with little public debate and deliberation, and often no
transparency. This is understandable but it also raises concerns. Critics of bailouts
worry that the government will abuse its powers in all the ways described above—
by rescuing firms that should fail, by discriminating against the politically weak,
and by creating moral hazard problems for the future.215 Transparency may be the
only way to mollify them and to maintain public support for the bailout process.
During the financial crisis, it was often difficult to understand why the
government made certain decisions—why it rescued Bear but let Lehman fail, for
example. The official reasons were often legalistic and not credible. For example,
officials explained that the Fed could not rescue Lehman because it lacked legal
authority to lend to an insolvent firm,216 yet the Fed did lend (indirectly) to Bear
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Stearns.217 In the AIG lawsuit, the plaintiffs argue that if the government really
sought to punish AIG for its reckless conduct (as government officials have
sometimes said), then the government should have brought legal proceedings
against AIG, which would have occurred with due process and independently of any
Fed loan.218 Critics complained that Paulson’s initial draft for EESA gave Treasury
almost unlimited authority, and that the later, more precisely written draft was
misleading. (It suggested that Treasury would buy toxic assets, when in fact
Treasury used most of the funds to buy preferred stock in banks.) Courts played
virtually no role in constraining the government during the crisis, and have been
only modestly more important in adjudicating post-crisis disputes.219
Similar complaints were leveled at the 2009 auto bailouts.220 The courts were
involved through the bankruptcy process. But the outcome was determined through
private negotiations. At best the judicial process ensured that the bailout plan
designed by the White House met with technical requirements of the bankruptcy
code.221 But the bankruptcy court had no power to review whether or not the
government financing of the GM and Chrysler firms prior to, throughout, and after
bankruptcy filings was an appropriate use of TARP funds. Treasury was nothing
more than a large secured creditor that was financing the bankruptcy proceedings –
how that came to be is not a question with which bankruptcy law is concerned.
Additionally, the bankruptcy court permitted the sales under a process that
foreordained the payouts to certain stakeholders, foreclosing a market test of the
government’s claims that no alternative was available.222
But at the other end of the spectrum is the Lockheed bailout. There Congress
had an open debate. And the bill almost failed. This highlights the most vexing
concern with bailouts. The general preference is for bailouts that are efficient in a
broad sense. But people have temporally inconsistent preferences. Ex ante the
public may view an optimal bailout as one that is good policy taking into account
moral hazard, fairness, and ex post efficiency. During the crisis, the public view will
be skewed by the salience of the immediate losses, questions about whether those
losses will be borne by certain constituencies, and by a general lack of information
about the true risk. Ex post, their views will be skewed by hindsight and other
biases. These problems are prevalent in all crises. Information and biases change
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continuously.223 The shifting public and political response to the threat of Ebola in
the fall of 2014 provides a recent example.224
In sum, process matters. The government needs discretion when it structures
bailouts, but it also can abuse that discretion. Procedural constraints are a triedand-true approach for limiting such abuse.
IV.

PRINCIPLES FOR GOVERNING BAILOUTS

Our diagnosis of the problems with bailouts suggests some principles for reform.
We are mindful of the paradox of regulating bailouts. Because bailouts occur ex
post, Congress can always change the rules of any statute that attempts to regulate
them. But this paradox should not be exaggerated. First, in practice, Congress has
delegated bailout power to regulators like the Fed and FDIC, and may be reluctant
to revise the statutes that govern those agencies in the midst of a crisis. Second,
even in a crisis a statute can be sticky. Congress may not want to repeal it, and if it
doesn’t, a court may interpret Congress’ actions in light of that statute. Finally,
even if statutory constraints are infeasible, it may be useful to state principles that
enable the public and press to evaluate an ongoing bailout. The principles thus
serve a political function.225
A. Substantive Principles
1. Ex Post Efficiency
Financial bailouts. Virtually all bailouts of illiquid but solvent financial firms
are ex post efficient. The reason is that the Fed can create as much liquidity as it
wants, and it is certain to be repaid if the firm is solvent. Thus, a bailout has zero
cost—indeed, may be profitable—for the taxpayer.226 On the benefit side, a loan to
an illiquid firm enables it to avoid failing. While the sale of goods at fire sale prices
is not itself an efficiency loss because the buyer gains what the seller loses, the
collapse of a firm can produce contagion that ultimately sucks credit from the
economy, causing macroeconomic harms. Even if it does not, the loss of
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organizational capital is likely to be severe.227 For these reasons, bailouts of illiquid
but solvent firms are socially desirable, all else equal.
The case for bailing out insolvent firms is more difficult. The benefits are the
same—the bailout reduces the risk of contagion and preserves organization capital.
But now there are costs. A loan to an insolvent firm is really just a transfer of
resources to the firm, and this cost must be paid by the taxpayer. (If the Fed makes
the loan, then the cost will show up indirectly as inflation or a taxpayer bailout of
the Fed, at least at the margin.) A further consideration is that sometimes it is not
clear whether a firm is insolvent or merely illiquid, especially during a financial
crisis; so there is a chance that a loan will be repaid. Moreover, a bailout of an
insolvent firm is often just an indirect way of bailing out its creditors—which may
be illiquid but solvent. To sum up, the case for bailing out an insolvent firm is
weaker than the case for bailing out an illiquid but solvent firm. There should be a
rebuttable presumption against such bailouts.
Non-financial bailouts. The case for bailing out non-financial firms is weaker
still. The reason is that the collapse of a non-financial firm will rarely have
contagion effects. Non-financial institutions typically rely much less on debt than
financial firms do; so losses are spread through thousands of equity-holders rather
than concentrated on a smaller number of debtors. The major argument for rescuing
non-financial firms arises when there is a systemic liquidity crisis—as occurred
during 2007-2008—and so these firms cannot borrow even a modest amount of
money, even when they are solvent. The bailout would be justified for purely
macroeconomic reasons—the failure of thousands of firms would cause a recession.
Thus, non-financial firms should be bailed out only under unusual circumstances—
when they are solvent but cannot borrow as a result of systemic collapse in the
credit market.
2. Moral Hazard
The major problem caused by bailouts is that they may generate perverse
incentives in the future. This raises the question whether a bailout should be
structured so as to minimize those effects. As we saw, if bailouts are given out too
freely, then creditors may disregard the credit and liquidity risk of borrowers, and
borrowers may thus be able to engage in excessive risk.
There are two ways to minimize this perversity. First, and most important,
bailouts should be given out only during a systemic financial crisis—that is, a crisis
where all or nearly all lending stops, in all areas of finance, probably at the global
level. Financial crises of this type are probably rare enough that their effect on
incentives will be small. The one exception is for firms that are too big to fail. If a
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firm’s own collapse poses systemic financial risk, the moral hazard problem is more
severe. Other remedies, such those we discuss next, are necessary in those cases.
Second, an argument can be made that bailouts should be accompanied by
haircuts,228 high interest rates (as advocated by Bagehot), and other penalties or
payments for ensuring that creditors and shareholders suffer some harm. The
prospect of such losses would further deter people from taking on excessive risk.
However, imposing such costs may do more harm than good. If people believe that
they will not be fully compensated, then they may hoard cash. Nevertheless, it
seems appropriate for our principles to allow for haircuts and related measures,
particularly when firms are viewed as too big to fail.
These points suggest that bailouts of firms during normal economic times are
almost always a bad idea. The government should carry a heavy burden of proof if it
believes that a bailout is necessary to halt an incipient crisis. This is particularly
true for non-financial firms, which typically are not systemically interconnected
with the financial system; and small, non-interconnected financial firms. Thus, we
advocate a strong presumption against bailouts except during a liquidity crisis that
affects the entire financial system. The presumption should be rebuttable where the
government can make the case that the failure of a firm would have significant
macroeconomic consequences, but we cannot think of any event in U.S. history that
would qualify.
By contrast, bailouts should be presumptively available during a liquidity crisis
for solvent firms, as Bagehot recommends. If the firms are solvent, then they cannot
be faulted for taking on too much credit risk. It may be the case that firms have
mismanaged liquidity. However, a true system-wide liquidity crisis will destroy
firms that have managed liquidity wisely as well as those that have managed
liquidity poorly. The government should not punish firms that have mismanaged
liquidity by denying them bailouts or imposing haircuts because (1) it will be very
difficult, during the crisis, to evaluate the quality of a firm’s liquidity management,
and so the government would risk punishing the wrong firms; (2) punishment is
inconsistent with the major goal of restoring confidence to creditors; and (3) there is
no way (short of winding down a firm) to hedge against a true liquidity crisis, so it is
doubtful that bailing out firms during a full-blown liquidity crisis will affect their
incentives to manage liquidity during normal times.
This leaves the category of financial firms that are insolvent during a liquidity
crisis. Bagehot argued that the central bank should not lend to such firms, but most
economists believe that such firms should not be allowed to collapse in a disorderly
fashion. The FDIC takes over insolvent banks and pays off depositors (in effect,
bailing them out) while winding down the institution. The Fed appears to have been
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seriously hampered during the 2007-2008 crisis by the rule that it cannot lend to
insolvent non-banks like Lehman.
The major worry is that if insolvent institutions are rescued, creditors will make
bad loans, knowing that the government is likely to pay them back. These loans will
produce significant costs to the real economy—in the form of, for example, the
construction of shopping malls that no one uses. On the other hand, if insolvent
institutions are systemically connected, their collapse exacerbates a liquidity crisis.
Accordingly, we suggest that there should be no presumption against lending to (or
investing in) insolvent firms during a full-blown liquidity crisis. However, the
government (or central bank) should be permitted to structure the loans so as to
penalize shareholders.
3. Fairness
One of the most difficult problems created by bailouts is that, unavoidably, some
people are benefited while others are not. During the 2007-2008 financial crisis,
bailouts benefited the creditors and shareholders of Bear more than those of
Lehman; the shareholders of Goldman and Morgan Stanley more than the
shareholders of AIG; and Wall Street firms more than homeowners. It is very likely
that numerous distributional outcomes are consistent with ex post and ex ante
efficiency. For example, it may be the case that the government could quiet a crisis
by bailing out firms A, B, and C, or B, C, and D, but need not bail out all four: if so,
how should it decide? The government could also impose haircuts of various sizes on
different creditors of the same firm.
The danger of unfairness is particularly acute during a financial crisis. In a
financial crisis, the government, as lender of last resort, effectively has a monopoly
over credit. Thus, it can charge a much higher price than is justified by moral
hazard concerns, and can discriminate in order to advance political aims. By
contrast, during normal times, the government has no such monopoly. If a firm
cannot obtain loans, that usually means it is insolvent, and there is no particular
worry if the government “overcharges” the firm, since the shareholders are not
entitled to any payoff.
In light of this argument, we suggest a few principles.
During financial crises, the government should set a price that reflects the
relevant economic parameters rather than the price that maximizes the return to
the government or taxpayers. This is simply a restatement of Bagehot’s advice that
government should charge a price somewhat higher than what would prevail in a
normal market. The key implication, however, is that the government may not
charge an even higher price, even if firms are willing to pay it. Other elements of
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Bagehot’s approach—such as the requirement that loans be fully secured—should
also be followed. Surprisingly, they are not already clearly embodied in the law.229
Avoid favoring politically connected firms. Many critics accused the government
of favoring politically connected banks—above all, Goldman Sachs and Citigroup.
Hank Paulson, the Treasury Secretary during the Bush administration, was a
former Goldman CEO, and hired numerous Goldman executives to work in the
Treasury.230 Timothy Geithner, the NYFRB president and then Treasury Secretary,
admitted in his memoirs that he underestimated Citigroup’s problems because his
mentor, Robert Rubin, sat on its board.231 The public perception that the
government favored Wall Street complicated the government’s response. The public,
for example, wanted the government to cut the salaries of Wall Street executives,
while the government believed that in some cases it lacked the legal authority to do
so, and in other cases that such a move would deter banks from seeking help or
cause the resignations of executives who were in the best position to help banks
return to health. But while one can ask the government to be sensitive about this
problem, it is unrealistic to propose that it refuse to bail out politically connected
firms. All major firms are politically connected.
Favor ordinary people, such as homeowners. Many critics of the government’s
handling of the financial crisis who believed that the government favored Wall
Street argued that the government should have done more for homeowners. Late in
the crisis, the government responded by creating some programs to help bail out
homeowners, but these had little effect, as we discussed above. We agree that, all
else equal, it makes more sense for the government to bail out ordinary people than
large firms. A key distinction is that ordinary people are risk-averse, while large
firms are owned by diversified shareholders. Unfortunately, bailouts of ordinary
people such as homeowners may be administratively infeasible. As the number of
bailout recipients increase, the government must spend more money on
administrative costs. These bailouts also raise other fairness questions—for
example, why favor people who bought homes on credit over other kinds of debtors,
like credit card debtors?
Avoid disfavoring foreigners. A politically sensitive issue during the crisis was
the treatment of foreign financial institutions.232 The Fed ended up bailing out
229
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foreign banks as well as domestic banks because the credit market is global, not
national. If foreigners believe they will not be rescued, and so refuse to lend to
American institutions, then the credit crisis will not be solved. But the public had
no sympathy for foreigners, and the Fed tried to conceal its efforts on their behalf.233
Here, we think the Fed was correct. As a presumption, financial bailouts should not
discriminate against foreigners.
Is distributive neutrality possible? A kind of formal distributive neutrality is
achievable if the government can commit itself to general eligibility standards that
classes of firms satisfy.234 If it were to do so, it would simply announce that any firm
that satisfied the principle described above would be entitled to a bailout. This may
not be practical, however. One problem is that the government may be overwhelmed
by applications for bailouts, especially during a financial crisis; another is that the
principles are malleable enough to permit favoritism at the margin.
Dodd-Frank permits only bailouts of groups of firms that satisfy broad-based
eligibility requirements.235 This would limit favoritism toward individual firms. The
crisis provides some examples of what broad-based requirements could mean. The
Fed set up a number of facilities that extended credit to certain classes of debtors—
banks that sought to borrow against asset-backed securities, primary dealers, firms
that rely on the commercial paper market, and so on. Broad-based requirements do
not eliminate the risk of discrimination because the government can design the
requirements to favor certain firms. But they do probably make favoritism toward
individual firms a bit more difficult than it might otherwise be.
Whether such a principle would be justified is hard to say. The benefit, as noted,
is that it would reduce discrimination, but the reduction might be minimal. The cost
of such a principle is that it may sometimes be the case that rescues of individual
firms are justified. The government believed (correctly or not) that if Long Term
Capital Management failed, it would take numerous big banks with it.236 During
the 2007-2008 crisis, individualized loans were made to rescue Bear and AIG, and
an individualized loan should probably have been made to save Lehman. The
configuration of credit networks is unpredictable; broad-based eligibility
requirements may thus interfere with needed rescues in future crises.
4. Administrative Costs
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A last consideration is that if the government offers bailouts too freely, it will be
overwhelmed by applications for money. Bagehot said that the central bank should
lend to “this man and that,” and section 13(3) allows the Fed to lend to anyone. But
Bagehot also argued that the rate should be set high enough to deter people for
applying for cheap loans who really did not need them.
These are arguments for credit rationing, and they raise anew the worry that the
central bank can use arguments about administrative costs to disguise favoritism
toward politically connected firms.
Worries about administrative costs might explain why Dodd-Frank requires the
Fed to use broad-based programs with uniform eligibility requirements. On this
approach, Fed officials do not need to weigh the benefits and costs of loans on a
borrower-by-borrower basis, and instead can delegate to subordinates the
mechanical process of determining whether applicants satisfy the eligibility
requirements. As we noted above, we are skeptical that broad-based eligibility
requirements can really constrain the Fed. While the Fed may be able to use
administrative costs as an explanation for discriminating against some firms, such
explanations must be evaluated carefully.
B. Procedural Principles
What procedural principles should govern bailouts?
Should Congress bail out firms or should regulatory agencies do so? Generally
speaking, a regulator should engage in bailouts for the same reason that regulators
typically engage in executive action—they can act more quickly and flexibly than
Congress can, and are less likely to be influenced by irrelevant political factors. The
financial crisis provides the best illustration of this claim. The Fed and FDIC were
able to bail out firms with great rapidity and flexibility. By contrast, when Congress
was forced to act, it acted slowly and erratically; produced a statute that paid off
various interest groups in order to obtain the consent of recalcitrant members of
Congress; and in the end gave almost unlimited discretion to Treasury.
Congressional involvement may have been necessary for political legitimacy, but if
it had been avoidable, it should have been avoided.237
Economists and central bankers seem largely in consensus that central banks
should not make emergency loans to insolvent firms.238 They believe that central
banks occupy a precarious position in a democracy because they must be given
independence so that they can resist short-term political pressures—for example, to
A huge literature exists on the closely related question of whether the central bank should be
independent or not. For a valuable, recent discussion in the context of emergency liquidity authority,
see Paul Tucker, Independent Agencies In Democracies: Legitimacy and Boundaries for the New
Central Banks (2014) (unpublished manuscript).
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use inflation to stimulate the economy before an election. To avoid a political
backlash, central banks must confine themselves to the least controversial actions
that are consistent with their mission. Loans that are paid back will create less
political outrage than loans that are not paid back and are instead absorbed by the
taxpayer.
All of this might be true, but it seems to us questionable. The political backlash
against the Fed during the last crisis took place even though the Fed did lend only
to solvent firms. The Fed’s failure to lend to Lehman—which was thought at the
time to be insolvent—was its greatest error. Congress punished the Fed, anyway.
We suspect that the Fed will maintain legitimacy and independence just to the
extent that it fulfills its mission. If it stops a financial crisis with speed and
efficiency, it will retain its independence. This suggests that it should be given a
broad array of tools, including the power to make loans to insolvent firms if it
believes that the loans will help end a crisis.
Should regulators hold hearings before bailouts? Many people complained that
regulators acted without transparency during the financial crisis. Transparency
would have required some kind of public process like a hearing in which interested
parties could submit arguments for or against a proposed bailout. All things equal,
hearings make sense because they inform the public and may provide evidence and
arguments against bailouts that are unwise. The recipients of potential bailouts
should be given an opportunity to propose terms, as should affected parties (such as
creditors of the recipient). However, sometimes there will not be enough time for
hearings, and often it may be the case that a proposed bailout must be kept secret
until the last minute. Secrecy may be necessary to facilitate private rescues or to
enable the government to put off a decision until one is necessary. Still, on balance
there should be a presumption in favor of a hearing.
Should courts play a role in bailout regulation? Judicial involvement is
unavoidable because bailouts must obey constitutional norms and relevant state
and federal law constraints on lending transactions and corporate investments. But
the amount of judicial involvement is a policy choice. At one extreme, we could
imagine that parties affected by a bailout could seek judicial review before the
bailout is consummated. The court would approve the bailout only if it complies
with our substantive principles, giving the appropriate deference to the factual
determinations of the regulator. At another extreme, judicial review could be
limited. Our view is that because of the inherent limitations of judicial review,
courts should not be permitted to block otherwise lawful bailouts that violate the
principles that we propose.239
However, courts could play a more significant role after the bailout and the
return of normal markets. In principle, courts could determine ex post if the bailout
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complied with the principles that we have proposed. If a bailout imposed excessively
harsh terms on a party, or was improperly denied, the affected parties might
appropriately be entitled to a remedy.
The role of courts in reviewing bailouts is currently being litigated. Because no
statutory bailout framework exists, the claims are based on the Takings Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. 240 The vagueness of this clause renders it less than ideal for
evaluating these claims. If courts decide that a judicial role in evaluating bailouts is
appropriate under the Constitution, then the case for a statutory framework would
be strengthened.
For example, a statute could create a specific cause of action for challenging a
bailout. To allow for the discretion necessary for implementing bailouts, the
challenge would have to be after the fact and provide for damages rather than
injunctive relief. The particular elements of the claim could be grounded in the
substantive principles laid out above. The benefit of doing so would be to direct the
judicial oversight to the specific areas where government actors are most likely to
abuse their discretion. This would be more precise and targeted than litigation
based on vague Takings claims. To cover the full scope of potential violations,
standing would have to be expanded to include those who could pursue more
general claims that the substantive principles have been violated.241
On the other hand, even ex post litigation can chill the exercise of discretion in
an emergency. The more onerous are the penalties imposed after the fact, the more
hesitant a government actor will be to implement a bailout program. Personal
liability for government actors, for example, would be too extreme. The benefit of
creating damages claims against the government is that they impose a political cost
along with providing transparency through judicial review. The key is to calibrate
those political costs to discourage government actors from the more capricious use of
their bailout authority while not deterring them from using that authority when
justified.
CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX OF BAILOUT REGULATION
Dodd-Frank’s sponsors and supporters argued that the statute would make
future bailouts unnecessary, and yet at the same time the statute continues to
authorize the Fed to issue bailouts (albeit subject to greater restrictions than in the
past) and gives the FDIC greater authority to make bailouts than under prior law.
This schizophrenia has long been characteristic of bailout regulation, which does
indeed have a paradoxical element to it.
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The paradox is that the government wants both to commit not to make bailouts
and to be able to make bailouts if they are necessary. The reason for committing not
to make bailouts is that if bailouts are not available, then people will be more
prudent with their finances, and thus financial crises may never occur. But the
reason for making bailouts available is that even if people are prudent with their
finances—or, if they are not but are able to exploit loopholes in order to circumvent
regulation—then bailouts are necessary to prevent macroeconomic collapse.
Over the years, governments have attempted to solve the paradox by
establishing ex ante insurance programs, under which potential bailout
beneficiaries pay in advance for their bailouts and submit to regulation that
requires them to behave prudently. Unfortunately, insurance systems are only as
good as predictions about the future, and the crystal ball is always hazy. The
paradox of bailout regulation is that because the conditions under which bailouts
are issued are unpredictable, it is impossible to set up an ex ante insurance system
to govern all such conditions. This means that bailouts will always be necessary,
and to some extent discretionary.
This creates another problem. If the government enjoys discretion as to which
firms to bail out, and how to do so, it can abuse this discretion—to reward political
favorites (by offering them bailouts) and to punish others (by refraining from giving
them bailouts). Thus, despite the heterogeneousness and unpredictability of the
conditions that justify bailouts, there is value in confining the government’s
discretion, even if only at the margins, by supplying legal or political principles for
evaluating the work of bailout authorities.
If our arguments are accepted, then some legal reforms would be necessary.
Dodd-Frank’s constraints on bailouts should be eliminated, so that the Fed can
make individualized rescues as well as bailouts based on broad-based eligibility
rules. Congress should also either pass laws or issue non-binding statements that
encourage regulators to bail out companies only when the negative macroeconomic
effects of failure are significant and the moral hazard effects are limited. Procedural
constraints should also be put into effect. Perhaps, inspectors general and other
watchdogs can be put on the alert for political favoritism in bailout policy.
Regulators should be required to provide guidance documents that explain how they
plan to administer and structure bailouts should the need arise.
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